terça-feira, 24 de fevereiro de 2015

Why India should resuscitate IBSA




















PostWestern World 
17 fev 2015

If asked to identify the most important trend in international affairs since the turn of the century, many international affairs analysts would point to the unprecedented growth in South-South relations. 

That is largely due to the rise of China, which has transformed global trade flows: South-South trade has overtaken North-South trade, and China is the most important trading partner of virtually the entire developing world.

Long-term agreements like the one between China and Argentina (regarding infrastructure, nuclear power plants, military and satellite equipment, commodity payment schemes and an $11 billion currency swap) are set to proliferate in the coming years. Similar agreements exist with Venezuela, which has borrowed $50 billion from Chinese banks since 2007. 


All that will consolidate both China's  economic and political influence in the Global South. The fact that a growing number of world leaders, under pressure from China, have spurned or downgraded meetings with the Dalai Lama is just one reflection of this trend.

Seen from Delhi, China's growing global influence is both an opportunity and a threat. On the one hand, growing fear of China's hegemonic ambitions has turned India into the darling of US policy makers who see a strong India as the best bet to contain China in its region (a similar logic applies to India's ties to Russia and Japan). 


On the other hand, as it seeks to strengthen its economic presence in the Global South, India will find it increasingly difficult to compete with a well-entrenched Chinese presence in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 

Last year, Modi met many Latin American heads of state, but it occurred during the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, and hence under the shadow of Xi Jinping's presence. A similar dynamic dominated the 5th BRICS Summit in Durban, when Modi's predecessor met several African leaders.

India's economic clout is still far smaller than China's, yet with India's growth potential in mind, foreign policy makers in Delhi are already building  a network of partnerships and platforms the country will need in the coming decades to sustain its ambitions. 


One example is the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), which underlines India's long-term plans on the world's fastest-growing continent. In the same way, IBSA, the trilateral grouping consisting of India, Brazil and South Africa, provides an important opportunity for India to regularly consult with two leading regional powers in Africa and South America.

IBSA, however, is now largely dormant due to a combination of the BRICS grouping's success and domestic crises in Brazil and South Africa. 


Both Presidents Rousseff and Zuma preside over a toxic mix of economic stagnation, stubbornly high inequality and corruption scandals, which have dramatically reduced their foreign policy ambitions. Indeed, seen from Delhi, neither Brazil nor South Africa currently look like very attractive partners.

And yet, there are strong arguments for Modi to assume leadership and resuscitate the IBSA grouping. Over the past decade, the platform has allowed the three countries to cooperate in an unprecedented range of issues such as public health, global governance reform, and economic development. 


In 2011, IBSA sent a delegation to Syria in an attempt to negotiate a ceasefire with the Assad regime. The three governments set up their own development fund, which, though small, has been praised for its innovative practices. 

There are now 16 working groups on issues such as agriculture, defense and public administration, made up of policy makers from each countries' ministries. 

Put simply, IBSA reduces, at a very small cost, mutual ignorance between three of the most important democracies in the Global South, providing member countries with a platform to cooperate whenever it is in their common interest.

The crises in Brazil and South Africa will pass, but it may take several years before the two countries can return to the foreign policy activism of the Lula/Mbeki years. 


Modi, by contrast, possesses ample political capital (despite the recent electoral setback in Delhi) to assume international leadership and undertake foreign policy initiatives. It thus depends largely on him to follow-up on his promise to host the next IBSA Summit in Dehli in 2015.  Of course, IBSA will never be a centerpiece of India's foreign policy. 

Yet as China's economic and diplomatic influence increases in the developing world, India would be well-advised to invest in autonomous platforms and networks that can help it strengthen its partnerships in the Global South in the long-term.

fonte: Post Western World

domingo, 22 de fevereiro de 2015

Aumenta tensão entre Brasil e Indonésia

























Indonésia reage e convoca embaixador brasileiro

Folha SP
20 fev 2015

Em mais um sinal de tensão entre os dois países, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores da Indonésia convocou nesta sexta-feira (20) o embaixador do Brasil em Jacarta, Paulo Soares, para uma reunião neste sábado (21).

A convocação foi uma reação do governo indonésio ao fato de a presidente Dilma Rousseff ter se recusado a receber, na manhã desta sexta, as credenciais de Toto Riyanto, novo embaixador do país do sudeste asiático no Brasil.

A negativa a receber as credenciais significa um gesto de censura por parte do Brasil diante do fato de a Indonésia ter executado o brasileiro Marco Archer Cardoso Moreira, 53, em 18 de janeiro, e de ameaçar fuzilar Rodrigo Muxfeldt Gularte, 42, nas próximas semanas. Ambos foram condenados à morte naquele país por tráfico de drogas.

O Itamaraty trabalha com duas possibilidades de reação por parte da Indonésia, ambas negativas: 

1) a Indonésia dirá ao Brasil que pretende convocar o embaixador Toto Riyanto para consultas –um sinal de reprovação, que o governo brasileiro já adotou logo depois de Marco Archer ter sido executado; 
2) considerará o embaixador brasileiro "persona non grata" e dará prazo para que ele deixe a Indonésia.

DIFICULDADES

O fato é que qualquer uma dessas medidas atrapalhará as negociações diplomáticas entre Brasil e Indonésia para livrar Rodrigo Muxfedlt Gularte da execução. Nesta sexta (20), em Jacarta (capital do país), o Brasil entregou uma carta ao procurador-geral Indonésio, HM Prasetyo, e ao chefe da prisão onde Rodrigo está, Hendra Eka Putra, na qual pede para transferir o brasileiro para um hospital.

Rodrigo foi diagnosticado como tendo esquizofrenia, por médico credenciado pelo governo indonésio. A defesa dele e o governo brasileiro pretendem usar a doença para tirá-lo da lista de próximos executados –o governo local queria executá-lo em fevereiro, mas adiou a data, ainda não divulgada. 


Uma resposta ao pedido de internação é esperada para semana que vem, segundo Ricco Akbar, advogado que o defende.

A Indonésia pode ou não aceitar a internação do brasileiro. À imprensa local, o procurador-geral HM Prasetyo disse, também nesta sexta (20), que o fato de um prisioneiro ter doença mental não impede que ele seja executado. 


Ele não quis antecipar, no entanto, se Rodrigo será de fato fuzilado.

O brasileiro perdeu todos os recursos na Justiça para escapar da morte. Em 5 de janeiro, o presidente Joko Widodo negou pedido de clemência a Rodrigo – o último passo que, do ponto de vista legal, o impedia de ser morto.


fonte: Folha SP

Entrevista: Celso Amorim

Fechar embaixadas seria retrocesso impraticável, diz Celso Amorim

Folha SP
22 fev 2015
 
Fechar embaixadas e consulados do Brasil no exterior seria um "retrocesso impraticável", apesar do aperto orçamentário que tem deixado alguns postos sem dinheiro até para pagar a conta de luz.

Essa é a opinião do ex-chanceler Celso Amorim, que, com o ex-presidente Lula, ampliou expressivamente o número de diplomatas no Itamaraty e os postos no exterior.

Para ele, é "esquisito" que o Brasil tenha deixado de participar ativamente na política internacional. Amorim lança em março o livro "Teerã, Ramalá e Doha: Memórias da Política Externa Ativa e Altiva ", em que conta bastidores de negociações. 



Abaixo, trechos da entrevista que o ex-ministro deu à Folha.

Folha - O Brasil, junto com a Turquia, negociou um acordo de troca de combustível nuclear com o Irã, em 2010. Mas o acordo não foi aceito por países como Estados Unidos e França, que acabaram impondo sanções contra o Irã. O fato de o Brasil ter costurado esse acordo mudou a estatura do país no cenário internacional?

Celso Amorim - Na época, vários analistas diziam que, independentemente de o acordo ser ou não seguido, o Brasil demonstrou que a sua capacidade de ação internacional de mediação. O próprio fato de hoje estarem discutindo um acordo provisório indica isso. Nós mostramos que era possível. Pode ser que eles hoje cheguem a outro acordo, não sei se vai ser melhor. 


O estoque de urânio do Irã hoje é muito maior do que era. Na época, daria para fazer uma bomba. Hoje em dia, dá para fazer umas quatro ou cinco. O acordo não foi para frente porque nós não controlamos a política interna de certos países....

Folha: O então presidente Lula se sentiu traído pelo líder americano Barack Obama, porque os EUA incentivaram a mediação do Brasil e, na hora agá, tiraram o corpo fora?
 

Essas palavras são muito pessoais, eu falo só em meu nome. Não estava fora dos nossos cálculos que isso pudesse acontecer, mas nós achávamos que, diante de um acordo exatamente nos termos que haviam sido solicitados, não ocorresse. 

Não fizemos isso em momento algum para sermos bonzinhos com o Irã. 

Temos interesses em ter relação com o Irã, assim como todo mundo tem. Com o atual acordo provisório, França e Alemanha já voltaram a vender para o Irã. E nós ficamos um pouco para trás. 

São quase 80 milhões de habitantes, grande produtor de petróleo, evidente que temos interesse. E se o Brasil quiser ter um papel no oriente Médio, como eu acho que deve ter, não dá para ignorar o Irã.

Folha: Você fala no livro que o próprio Obama teria dito que a demora em adotar sanções contra os iranianos poderia levar a um ataque de Israel contra o Irã...
 

Sim, fiquei estarrecido e comentei com o presidente Lula: é o protetor com medo do protegido. É o reconhecimento da incapacidade de persuadir um aliado ultra-próximo, que depende de você para muita coisa.

Folha: Em uma entrevista em 2010, o senhor me disse que uma autocrítica que faria era a falta de estratégia do Brasil para lidar com a China. O que o senhor teria feito diferente?
 

Não é que tenhamos negligenciado, o presidente foi à China várias vezes, agora mesmo fui sondado para presidir o Conselho Empresarial Brasil China. Mas no último ano e meio, dei relativamente pouca atenção à China. A China é tão grande, é como os EUA. 

A gente deve ter uns 10 consulados nos EUA e deveríamos ter no mínimo o mesmo número na China. Mas todo mundo criticava que eu tinha criado muito consulado, muita embaixada.

Folha: Inclusive nos EUA há vários consulados sem dinheiro para pagar a conta de luz, de aquecimento...
 

Isso eu não vou comentar.....
 

Mas voltando à China, talvez pudéssemos ter feito mais. Assinamos um acordo de cooperação em defesa com a China recentemente. Nessa área, nós temos que cooperar igualmente com todos os Brics,

Folha: Com a Rússia também? 


Eu não vejo porque não. Não é para ter um acordo de defesa com a Rússia, mas material, transferência de tecnologia. Ciência e tecnologia não vêm com ideologia carimbada.

Folha: Muita gente condena o fato de o Brasil ter apostado tudo na rodada multilateral da OMC e não ter outros acordos comerciais de peso....
 

Nós e a torcida do Flamengo apostamos na OMC. E a coisa que mais interessava ao Brasil eram os subsídios agrícolas, e isso só seria resolvido na rodada multilateral. 

Outros países queriam acordos que nos obrigariam a fazer muito mais concessões do que eram exigidas em Doha. Com a política industrial atual, que ainda quer fortalecer a indústria brasileira, é muito difícil. Não sou contra um acordo com a UE, mas continuo achando que o acordo multilateral é essencial para o Brasil. 

É preciso ver se a UE fará concessões e se as exigências que eles nos farão não serão de tal ordem que liquidem qualquer possibilidade de política industrial ou tecnológica. Tem que ser bem negociado, porque os negociadores do outro lado contam com o apoio da mídia deles e da nossa.

Folha: No livro, o senhor elogia o ex-presidente americano George W Bush e critica Obama. Para o Brasil, qual dos dois foi melhor?

A atitude mais pacifista do Obama é muito positiva, apesar das idas e vindas, como no caso do Irã. Mas o Bush era mais direto, tinha diálogo franco, e no Obama eu nunca percebi a mesma confiança. Ele era paternalista. Nós oferecemos situações que ajudariam o Obama, não só em relação ao Irã, mas em relação à Venezuela e ao Equador, e ele não deu atenção. 


O Bush e os republicanos têm uma visão mais realista, eles compreendem melhor a importância do Brasil. No partido Democrata há uma tendência de tratar tudo como se fosse "hemisfério ocidental". Nesse sentido o Bush foi mais positivo.

Folha: Você diz que o presidente Lula tinha muito clara a importância da política externa. Como era o relacionamento entre vocês dois?
 

Eu sentia que eu tinha a confiança do presidente Lula, que podia ir adiante, e se por acaso fizesse algo que não correspondia, ele diria ô Celso, o que que é isso, e a gente ia discutir e por tudo em pratos limpos. Ele se interessava por política externa.

Folha: E com a presidente Dilma como era o relacionamento?
 

Pessoal? Muito bom, respeitoso, gosto muito da presidenta.

Folha: Mas era um estilo bastante diferente?
 

Ela é que é a presidenta, a pessoa é que precisa se adaptar a ela, e não vice-versa.

Folha: O senhor escreveu recentemente um artigo para Folha sobre a falta de recursos para o Itamaraty. Existe uma discussão agora sobre a necessidade de fechar alguns postos no exterior, já que não há orçamento....

Eu não acredito que isso ocorra. Isso seria um retrocesso impraticável para um país como o Brasil. Há países que estão em declínio, foram grandes potências e hoje não mais. Eles podem até pensar dessa maneira. 


O Brasil não pode pensar dessa maneira. É um recurso tão pequeno (do Itamaraty) que isso não vai ter peso no conjunto das coisas. Os postos no exterior são essenciais, têm um efeito multiplicador. Cresceu muito o volume de negócios que o Brasil passou a fazer nos países árabes, na África. 

A escolha do Brasil para ser sede das Olimpíadas, a eleição do Roberto Azevêdo na OMC, José Graziano na FAO. Nenhum país tem a FAO e a OMC ao mesmo tempo se não tem também uma boa diplomacia. Um pouco de dinheiro isso envolve. Mas dentro do Orçamento da União é mínimo.

Folha: Em 2014, houve uma reunião internacional sobre a guerra civil na Síria, realizada em Montreux, na Suíça. O Brasil foi convidado, mas a presidente Dilma resolveu não enviar o chanceler, na época o Luiz Alberto Figueiredo. Naquela ocasião, encontrei com um diplomata estrangeiro que achava estranho o Brasil ter lutado tanto para ter um lugar à mesa, e agora não participar.
 

Eu também acho muito esquisito. Quando nos convidaram para ir a Anápolis (nos EUA, conferência sobre Oriente Médio em 2007), o Brasil estava lá. Fui numa conferência até sobre Afeganistão, o Brasil era o único país latino-americano convidado. São certas coisas que você tem que fazer. 

Eu e o presidente Lula, nós temos uma visão de que o Brasil deve ter uma participação intensa. Mas estou otimista, tenho muita confiança no Mauro Vieira (chanceler), trabalhamos juntos várias ocasiões, foi meu chefe de gabinete, esteve em Buenos Aires. 

fonte: Folha de SP

sexta-feira, 20 de fevereiro de 2015

III Cúpula CELAC: uma reunião dedicada ao combate à fome






















Diplomacia Pública
30 jan 2015

Com o Plano de Ação para 2015 e o Plano para Segurança Alimentar, Nutrição e Erradicação da Fome 2025, adotados  em São José da Costa Rica, na III Cúpula da CELAC, os países da América Latina e do Caribe dão importantes passos na direção da integração regional e do combate à pobreza e à exclusão social.
Na Cúpula, os Chefes de Estado da América Latina e Caribe apoiaram a candidatura do brasileiro José Graziano à reeleição a Diretor-Geral da FAO, em manifestação do compromisso da região com a erradicação da fome e da miséria no mundo.
Nos últimos 15 anos, a América Latina e o Caribe registraram enormes progressos no combate à fome e cumpriram um dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milênio estabelecidos pela ONU: reduziu-se pela metade o número de pessoas subalimentadas. 
O Plano de Segurança Alimentar, que foi elaborado pela FAO a pedido da I Reunião de Chanceleres da CELAC, ocorrida em 2013, abrange uma ampla gama de políticas públicas de segurança alimentar e nutricional, tais como programas de abastecimento, transferência de renda condicionada e alimentação escolar, com vistas a erradicar definitivamente o flagelo da subalimentação nos próximos 10 anos.
O bom desempenho dos indicadores sociais na região, mesmo no contexto de desaceleração do crescimento da economia mundial a partir de 2008, deveu-se não apenas ao extraordinário crescimento do comércio intrazona, que quadruplicou nos últimos 15 anos, mas principalmente à adoção de políticas de inclusão social. 
A CELAC é um espaço privilegiado para o intercâmbio das diversas experiências de políticas públicas voltadas para a inclusão social que vêm sendo adotadas pelos Governos da região, e o Brasil tem muito a contribuir com as novas tecnologias sociais que foram desenvolvidas nos últimos 15 anos. 
Por exemplo, o Brasil promoveu em novembro de 2014, a I Reunião Ministerial sobre Agricultura Familiar, que contou com expressiva participação de países da CELAC.
A cúpula de São José acontece poucas semanas após a primeira reunião de Chanceleres da CELAC e da China, em Pequim, na qual foi adotado um amplo programa de cooperação abrangendo diversas áreas, da infraestrutura à educação. 
(leia também a matéria sobre o Fórum CELAC-CHINA aqui no Missão Diplomática).  
O Foro CELAC-China representa uma segunda dimensão de atuação da CELAC: a coordenação do relacionamento com terceiros países e regiões. 
Um exercício semelhante já se desenvolve com a União Europeia,  e novas inciativas serão anunciadas na II Cúpula CELAC-EU, em junho próximo, em Bruxelas.

quarta-feira, 18 de fevereiro de 2015

Análise: Novos Desafios na Integração Sulamericana

Um recente informe da Comissão Econômica para América Latina e o Caribe (Cepal), “Panorama Social da América Latina 2014”, mostra um dado preocupante. 
Nos últimos três anos os níveis de pobreza teriam deixado de cair na nossa região. 
Como esse estancamento deu-se na porcentagem de pobres sobre a população total, e esse denominador tem um crescimento vegetativo, significa que o número absoluto de pessoas na pobreza tem aumentado.
A queda continuada em números absolutos e relativos da pobreza na região era uma das marcas do ciclo de governos progressistas na América Latina, iniciado com o governo Chávez na Venezuela em 1999 e muito reforçado pelo governo Lula desde 2003. As Missões na Venezuela e o Bolsa Família no Brasil são referências nesta pauta. 
Mas há que se destacar que, para além de programas-estrela, tratou-se de um conjunto de medidas que impulsionavam a região para além da herança neoliberal dos anos 1980-90. Em vários casos vimos avançar a volta do mercado de trabalho formal, do aumento dos salários reais e da cobertura da seguridade social. 
Como resultado mais amplo também os indicadores de desigualdade social, medida pela renda, começaram a ceder.
O fenômeno detectado pelo informe da Cepal merece uma análise mais aprofundada e abrangente de que ainda não dispomos. Mas propomos a seguir alguns pontos de análise econômica e identificamos desafios políticos que se abrem para América Latina, em geral.
A crise do capitalismo central em 2008 pegou a região em uma fase intermediária. Muitos governos tinham iniciado políticas pós-neoliberais, no combate à pobreza e na recuperação do papel do Estado na economia e na sociedade, mas continuavam muito dependentes de um mercado mundial capitalista globalizado – tanto para financiar suas economias com exportações decommodities como para satisfazer seu consumo interno com produtos industrializados importados extrarregião. 
Podemos resumir na fórmula:  Fortaleza política interna graças a um eleitorado que reconhece que sua situação socioeconômica melhorou muito nesses anos, dificuldades econômicas externas pela vulnerabilidade frente às pressões do capital financeiro internacional.
Todo o questionamento feito desde o sindicalismo e os demais movimentos sociais ao projeto da Área de Livre Comércio das Américas (Alca) na campanha vitoriosa desenvolvida entre 1997 e 2005 vinha acompanhado de uma proposição sobre a necessidade de uma nova arquitetura financeira regional. 
De fato, os governos ensaiaram alguns passos. Decidiram que o comércio intrarregional poderia se fazer sem o uso do dólar como moeda de trocas, bem como sobre a criação de bancos regionais fora do alcance das decisões dos países do capitalismo central, e também, a respeito de processos de cooperação e intercâmbio tecnológico e social. 
Porém, tudo isso foi muito pouco desenvolvido, seja no âmbito do Mercosul, da União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul) ou da Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (Celac). Faltou tempo, mas sobretudo faltou decisão política de se avançar aceleradamente neste rumo.
Os recentes acordos com a China para aceder a pacotes de investimentos e financiamentos permite aliviar a situação de nossos países, mas não resolve o problema estrutural da fragilidade de nossas economias quando dispersas e expostas às pressões do capitalismo central. 
A construção de graus maiores de autonomia econômica regional no contexto da nova geometria do poder mundial passa por uma construção econômico-financeira regional que está muito aquém das nossas necessidades.
Esse déficit econômico no processo da integração não elimina, no entanto, o fato de que a construção regional política tenha continuado e em ritmo bastante acelerado. A Unasul tem tido um papel chave em constituir uma política de defesa regional e afastar gradualmente a América do Sul da área de influência dos EUA. 
O Mercosul continua crescendo regionalmente e, depois do ingresso da Venezuela, Bolívia e Equador estão em processo de incorporação. A Celac já é uma realidade, depois de passar pela presidência pro-tempore de Cuba.
Essa construção política regional está por detrás da mudança de política diplomática do imperialismo norte-americano. Em 2009, Washington teve de aceitar que a Organização de Estados Americanos (OEA) retirasse as sanções impostas por esse organismo interamericano em 1962 a Cuba. Agora em 2015 vai ter de aceitar a presença do presidente cubano na “Cúpula das Américas” a ser realizada em Panamá em abril. 
A recente retomada pelos governo Obama-Raúl Castro das relações diplomáticas são outro indicador de que os avanços regionais obrigam a diplomacia norte-americana a uma disputa hegemônica mais no campo da política que da força – mas sem perder a grossura, jamais!, como mostra o assédio à Venezuela que, ao mesmo tempo, tem contado com o apoio da Celac contra as sanções norte-americanas.
A provável eleição do atual chanceler uruguaio, Luis Almagro, militante da Frente Ampla, para o cargo de Secretário-geral da OEA na próxima Assembleia Geral em junho de 2015 seria um ponto alto de mudança no terreno político. 
Finalmente teremos um diplomata de esquerda dirigindo a principal trincheira da política “panamericanista” – expressão da velha Doutrina Monroe de uma América Latina como “pátio traseiro” da hegemonia norte-americana – não como rendição do progressismo latino-americano, mas como expressão do recuo norte-americano.
Mas todos esses avanços no plano da política irão por água abaixo se o capital internacional e o governo dos EUA encontram uma região dispersa e fragilizada economicamente. 
É hora de a política conduzir a economia e acelerar a integração regional produtiva e financeira para resgatar definitivamente a dívida social com nossos povos !
*Rafael Freire é Secretário de Política Econômica e Desenvolvimento Sustentável da Confederação Sindical de Trabalhadores-as das Américas (CSA) e integrante do Grupo de Reflexão sobre Relações Internacionais/GR-RI.

quarta-feira, 11 de fevereiro de 2015

[ Economistas ] George Stigler

George Stigler (1911-1991) was the quintessential empirical economist. Paging through his classic Microeconomics text The Theory of Price, one is struck by how many principles of economics are illustrated with real data rather than hypothetical examples. 

Stigler deserves a great deal of the credit for getting economists to look at data and evidence.


Stigler’s two longest-held positions were at Columbia University (1947–1958) and at the University of Chicago (1958–1991). 
From the early 1950s to the late 1960s, most of his research was in the field of industrial organization. A typical Stigler article laid out a new proposition with clear reasoning and then presented simple but persuasive data to back up his argument.
Take, for example, Stigler’s “A Note on Block Booking.” Block booking of movies was the offer of a fixed package of movies to an exhibitor; the exhibitor could not pick and choose among the movies in the package. The Supreme Court banned the practice on the grounds that the movie companies were compounding a monopoly by using the popularity of the winning movies to compel exhibitors to purchase the losers.
Stigler disagreed and presented a simple alternative argument. If Gone with the Wind is worth $10,000 to the exhibitor and Getting Gertie’s Garter is worth nothing, wrote Stigler, the distributor could get the whole $10,000 by selling Gone with the Wind. 
Throwing in a worthless movie would not cause the exhibitor to pay any more than $10,000. Therefore, reasoned Stigler, the Supreme Court’s explanation seemed wrong.
But why did block booking exist? Stigler’s explanation was that if exhibitors valued films differently from one another, the distributor could collect more by “bundling” the movies. 
Stigler gave an example in which exhibitor A is willing to pay $8,000 for movie X and $2,500 for Y, and B is willing to pay $7,000 for X and $3,000 for Y. If the distributor charges a single price for each movie, his profit-maximizing price is $7,000 for X and $2,500 for Y. The distributor will then collect $9,500 each from A and B, for a total of $19,000. 
But with block booking the seller can charge $10,000 (A and B each value the two movies combined at $10,000 or more) for the bundle and make $20,000. Stigler then went on to suggest some empirical tests of his argument and actually did one, showing that customers’ relative tastes for movies, as measured by box office receipts, did differ from city to city.
Stigler’s thinking on government regulation was even more influential than his work on industrial organization. Because of Stigler’s research, economists view regulation much more skeptically than their counterparts of the 1950s did. 
His first article on the topic, coauthored with longtime research assistant Claire Friedland and published in 1962, was titled “What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity.” 
They found that regulation of electricity prices had only a tiny effect on those prices. In the late 1970s, their finding was challenged by Gregg Jarrell, himself a Stigler student. 
But more important than this finding was their demonstration that one could examine the actual effects of regulation, and not just theorize about them.
Stigler devoted his entire 1964 presidential address to the American Economic Association to making this point. He argued that economists should study the effects of regulation and not just assume them. 
He twitted the great economists of the past who had given lengthy cases for and critiques of government regulation without ever trying to study its effects. In Stigler’s view things were not much better in the twentieth century. 
“The economic role of the state,” he said, “has managed to hold the attention of scholars for over two centuries without arousing their curiosity.” Stigler added, “Economists have refused either to leave the problem alone or to work on it.”
Many economists got the point. Since the mid-1960s, economists have used their sometimes awesome empirical tools to study the effects of regulation. Whole journals have been devoted to the topic. One is the Journal of Law and Economics, started at the University of Chicago in 1958. 
Another, the Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, later the RAND Journal, started in 1970. As a general rule economists have found that government regulation of industries harms consumers and often gives monopoly power to producers. 
Some of these findings were behind economists’ widespread support for the deregulation of transportation, natural gas, and banking, which gained momentum in the Carter administration and continued until halfway through the Reagan administration. Stigler was the single most important academic contributor to this movement.
Stigler was not content to examine the effects of regulation. He wanted to understand its causes. Did governments regulate industries, as many had believed, to reduce the harmful effects of monopoly? Stigler did not think so. 
In a seminal 1971 article, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” he presented and gave evidence for his “capture theory.” Stigler argued that governments do not end up creating monopoly in industries by accident. Rather, he wrote, they regulate at the behest of producers who “capture” the regulatory agency and use regulation to prevent competition. 
Probably more important than the evidence itself was the fact that Stigler made this viewpoint respectable in the economics profession. It has now become the mainstream view.
For his earlier work on industrial organization and his work on the effects and causes of regulation, Stigler was awarded the 1982 Nobel Prize for economics.
Stigler was an uncommonly clear and humorous writer. Economics from him never seemed like “the dismal science.” With his sometimes biting wit, he could put a profound insight into one sentence. In discussing the benefits of capitalism, for example, Stigler wrote: “Professors are much more beholden to Henry Ford than to the foundation that bears his name and spreads his assets.”
Not to be missed in a listing of Stigler’s contributions is his research on information. His 1962 article “Information in the Labor Market” was a watershed for further studies on unemployment. 
According to Stigler, job seekers needed short periods of unemployment in order to search for a higher wage. Even in industries with a “going wage,” variances in wage rates still exist. Therefore, the unemployed are as much information seekers as job seekers. His theory is now called the theory of search unemployment.
Information is also a problem for firms when they collude, implicitly or explicitly, to set prices. They do not know whether their competitors are secretly undercutting them. This uncertainty can be reduced, wrote Stigler, by spending resources to gather information. Stigler applied this insight to show that collusion is less likely to succeed if there are more firms in a market.
Also highly regarded as an economic historian, Stigler wrote numerous articles on the history of ideas in the early years of his career. His Ph.D. dissertation on the history of neoclassical production and distribution theories was highly acclaimed as a critical link in the chain of economic thought. 

Some of his articles in the area are collected in Five Lectures on Economic Problems (1950) and Essays in the History of Economics(1965). 

fonte: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics

terça-feira, 10 de fevereiro de 2015

[ Economistas ] Celso Furtado

Celso Furtado (1920–2004) was one of the most influential Latin American economists of the 20th century. 

He was head of the development division of the United Nations Commission for Latin America in the 1950s, where he helped to formulate the structuralist approach to economics.

His Formação Economica do Brasil (1959) is the classic interpretation of the economic history of Brazil. In 1961 he published a collection of essays about the notion of underdevelopment and development as interdependent phenomena.

Furtado's last contribution was his careful discussion in the 1970s of the concept of cultural and economic dependence in underdeveloped countries.

Furtado was born on 26 July 1920 in Pombal (state of Paraiba, northeast of Brazil), and died on 20 November 2004 in Rio.

Together with the Argentinean Raúl Prebisch, Furtado was the most widely read and influential Latin American economist of the second half of the 20th century.

A prolific writer, he published more than 20 books on the economic history of Brazil and Latin America and on the theory of economic development, many of them translated into English, French and other languages.

He graduated at Universidade do Brasil (Rio) in 1944 and received his doctorate from the Sorbonne (Paris) in 1948, with a thesis about the Brazilian colonial economy. Maurice Byé was his supervisor, but it was François Perroux who impressed him most at the time.

Upon his return to Brazil in that same year, Furtado was invited by Prebisch to join the staff of the new United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in Santiago. 

From 1950 to 1957 he was head of the development division of ECLA, when he left Santiago to spend the academic year at Cambridge University working with Nicholas Kaldor and Joan Robinson under a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship.

In 1958 he was appointed director of the Brazilian National Development Bank, where he conceived the project that led to the creation of SUDENE (Development Agency of the Northeast of Brazil) in 1959, of which Furtado was the first director.

In 1962 he also became Brazil’s first Minister of Planning, with the task of drafting a national economic plan, a position he held until 1963. Deprived of his political rights following the military coup in 1964, he left Brazil to take up appointments at American and European universities.

Furtado went back to Paris and became the first foreign professor to be appointed by the Sorbonne, where he taught development economics from 1965 to 1985. After the return of Brazil to democracy he was appointed Minister of Culture (1986-88), and elected to the Brazilian Academy of Letters and to the Brazilian Academy of Sciences in 1997 and 2003 respectively.

(Furtado’s autobiography, originally published in 3 volumes between 1985 and 1991, was collected in 1997; the first volume, with recollections from the 1950s, his most productive period, was translated into French in 1987.)

Furtado, together with Prebisch and other economists at ECLA in the 1950s, was one of the formulators of structuralism in Latin American economics.

His main contributions can be found in two books, both available in English. In his 1961 volume on economic development, which collected essays written during the 1950s, Furtado provided the most elaborate exposition of the structuralist analysis in the literature at the time.

In his 1959 classic Formação Economica do Brasil, written in Cambridge in 1957-58 and based on Furtado (1950, 1954), he applied for the first time the structuralist approach to the interpretation of the economic history of a Latin American country, an exercise he would expand to the whole region in his 1969 book.

Furtado’s methodological innovation was the use of historical investigation to identify factors that are specific to each structure through time: “bring history near to economic analysis, get from the latter precise questions and find answers in history”.

In Formação he pioneered the use of modern income analysis to deal with historical phenomena by introducing macroeconomic models into the analysis of each phase of Brazilian economic development from the 16th century to the 1950s (see also Furtado 1963 for a brief account).

Furtado’s role in the historiography of the industrialization process of Brazil in particular and Latin American in general may be compared to Alexander Gerschenkron’s well-known interpretation of the late industrialization of Russia and other continental countries.

Like Gerschenkron, Furtado examined industrialization from the point of view of history. Both rejected Walt Rostow’s view that the economic development of different countries goes through a succession of phases to which a single analytical framework can be applied.

The main feature of the 1959 book is that the economic history of Brazil (and other Latin American countries as well) must be based on an open growth model with international trade treated as an endogenous variable, since these countries’ economies evolved as suppliers of raw materials to the world market.

Furtado shows that throughout the four centuries from 1530 to 1930 the Brazilian economy depended on external demand to provide stimulus to higher productivity without previous capital accumulation, with three long-period cycles - sugar exports (1530-1650), gold mining (1700-1780) and the expansion of the world market for coffee (1840-1930) – and intervening periods of relative stagnation.

That phase came to an end in the economic crisis of 1929, when the collapse of export-commodity prices cut the country’s importpurchasing power in half. According to Furtado, the policy adopted by the Brazilian government at the time to maintain coffee price, by buying the unmarketable coffee and burning it, had the effect of an unwitting “Keynesian” anti-cyclical deficit-financing policy.

This contributed to keep domestic demand and, together with the diminished capacity to import, pushed up domestic prices of imported goods and stimulated investments in import-substituting industrial consumers’ goods.

That process marked the beginning of a new phase in the development of Brazil, based on internal demand and import-substituting industrialization. Brazilian late industrialization – as compared to the United States – is explained in part by the differences between the productive structure of Brazil’s export agriculture and the small agricultural properties in the English colonies of North America.

Brazilian internal market was much thinner due to the concentration of income and property, which served to maintain its stagnant colonial structure. Moreover, whereas the United States participated in the first wave of the industrial revolution as exporter of a key raw material (cotton), the main cause of the relative backwardness of the Brazilian economy in the first half of the 19th century, according to Furtado, was the damming up of its exports and the increase of the subsistence sector with lower productivity.

Also in contrast with the late industrialization of continental European countries in the second half of the 19th century studied by Gerschenkron, the import-substitution process in Latin America did not lead to an intensive development of producers’ goods industries and changes in international trade (exports of manufactured goods and imports of raw materials).

The evolution of trade patterns in Latin American countries during their industrialization period after 1930 was quite the opposite: exports were still based on some few commodities and imports concentrated on goods whose production required huge investments and/or advanced technology.

It was in attempting to explain the backwardness of Brazil that Furtado hit upon the idea that underdevelopment and development are two interdependent phenomena which appear simultaneously as part of the evolution of industrial capitalism.

The theme was elaborated in his 1961 book, where Furtado put forward concepts of economic underdevelopment and development that have been largely accepted in the literature. An underdeveloped structure is one in which “full utilization of available capital is not a sufficient condition to complete absorption of the working force at a level of productivity corresponding to the technology prevailing in the dynamic sector of the economy”.

Underdeveloped economies (as distinguished from simply backward ones) are hybrid structures characterized by technological heterogeneity of the various sectors. This comes from the historical fact that the import-substituting industrialization process in those economies led entrepreneurs to adopt a technology compatible with a cost and price structure similar to that prevailing abroad.

Technology becomes, therefore, an independent variable in economies where industrialization is induced from outside. Whereas industrialization in underdeveloped economies was determined by demand, the formation process of capitalist European economies in the 18th and 19th centuries was dominated by supply factors, which led Furtado to define economic development as the introduction of new combinations of production factors which increase labor productivity.

Underdevelopment is regarded as a permanent feature of the centreperiphery system, not as a stage on the road to development. Those ideas originally appeared in an essay written as the first critical comment on Ragnar Nurkse’s notion of “balanced growth” (advanced in Nurkse’s 1950 Rio lectures), where Furtado pointed out that the dynamics of demand (internal and external) in underdeveloped economies should be studied in tandem with the process of accumulation.

According to Furtado, underdeveloped countries lack incentives to save (because of the consumer habits of higher income classes), not to invest.

The accumulation process should be examined from the point of view of changes in the process of generation, utilization and appropriation of the economic surplus, especially as affected by foreign trade.

Furtado first developed these ideas in an essay originally written in Portuguese in 1955 (two years before Paul Baran made the concept of surplus a central notion of his own approach to development) and further elaborated it as part of a comment about Paul Rosenstein-Rodan’s theory of “big push”, made at the International Economic Association conference on economic development held in Rio in 1957, and in his 1967 and 1980 textbooks.

One of the main aspects of the industrialization process of Latin American countries, as discussed by Furtado in 1958, is the persistent tendency towards balance of payment crises.

Anticipating some elements of the two-gap model later developed by Chenery and Bruno, Furtado showed in a two-sector model featuring a modern and a backward sector how balance of payment disequilibrium could constraint the economic growth process under the assumption that the coefficient of import in the investment sector is larger than in the consumption sector, as is typically the case in underdeveloped countries.

Such chronic disequilibrium is caused by structural (not monetary) reasons and may lead to “strangulation” of economic growth. Another obstacle to growth is that, after the end of the “easy” phase of the substitution of imported consumers’ goods, as industrialization advances to the production of intermediate and capital goods, the rate of profit falls because of the higher capital/output ratio accompanied by increasing income concentration and lower aggregate demand.

This was an essential element of Furtado’s (1965, 1970) interpretation of the slowdown of economic growth in Latin America in the early 1960s, but, as the Brazilian economy recovered in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Furtado’s stagnationist argument was criticized by economists in Brazil (see Tavares and Serra 1973).

Furtado (1972, 1974, 1978) eventually concluded that, after the two earlier periods of economic growth – decided respectively by comparative advantages and import-substitution - the Latin American economy had entered a new dynamic path in which consumption demand by high income groups could under certain conditions become the leading factor of the system.

This led him to explore in detail a theme that had often come up in his writings in the 1950s: dependency theory.

Furtado argued that underdeveloped economies feature cultural dependence, that is, consumption patterns are historically transplanted from developed countries by the upper strata of the underdeveloped areas as a result of their appropriation of the economic surplus generated through comparative advantages in foreign trade.

Such modernized component of consumption brings dependence into the technological sphere by making it part of the production structure.

Dependent structures are also dualistic systems with unlimited supply of labor at a subsistence wage, as first described by Furtado (1950) in his investigation of the dynamics of the labor market in Brazilian economic history.

This is close to Arthur Lewis’s classic model, but, in contrast with Lewis, Furtado’s conclusion is that industrialization within a dualist dependent structure reproduces this dualism and does not bring about a homogeneous system with real wages increasing in tandem with the average productivity of the economy.

The relationship between the centre and the periphery in the world economy is defined not just by the unequal sharing of the benefits of development and technical progress (as in Prebisch’s terms-of-trade argument), but by dependence involving domination and control of access to modern technology by transnational corporations.

In Furtado’s view, economic growth does not entail economic development in dependent and reflex economies, since it implies an aggravation of both external and internal exploitation, and, by that, tends to make underdevelopment even more acute.

Mauro Boianovsky



segunda-feira, 9 de fevereiro de 2015

[ Economistas ] Milton Friedman

Milton Friedman (1912-2006) was the twentieth century’s most prominent advocate of free markets. 

Born in 1912 to Jewish immigrants in New York City, he attended Rutgers University, where he earned his B.A. at the age of twenty. 

He went on to earn his M.A. from the University of Chicago in 1933 and his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1946. In 1951 Friedman received the John Bates Clark Medal honoring economists under age forty for outstanding achievement. 

In 1976 he was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics for “his achievements in the field of consumption analysis, monetary history and theory, and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy.” 

Before that time he had served as an adviser to President Richard Nixon and was president of the American Economic Association in 1967. After retiring from the University of Chicago in 1977, Friedman became a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.


Friedman established himself in 1945 with Income from Independent Professional Practice, coauthored with SimonKuznets. In it he argued that state licensing procedures limited entry into the medical profession, thereby allowing doctors to charge higher fees than they would be able to do if competition were more open.
His landmark 1957 work, A Theory of the Consumption Function, took on the Keynesian view that individuals and households adjust their expenditures on consumption to reflect their current income. 
Friedman showed that, instead, people’s annual consumption is a function of their “permanent income,” a term he introduced as a measure of the average income people expect over a few years.
In Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman wrote arguably the most important economics book of the 1960s, making a case for relatively free markets to a general audience. He argued for, among other things, a volunteer army, freely floating exchange rates, abolition of licensing of doctors, a negative income tax, and education vouchers. (Friedman was a passionate foe of the military draft: he once stated that the abolition of the draft was almost the only issue on which he had personally lobbied Congress.) 
Many of the young people who read it were encouraged to study economics themselves. His ideas spread worldwide with Free to Choose (coauthored with his wife, Rose Friedman), the best-selling nonfiction book of 1980, written to accompany a TV series on the Public Broadcasting System. This book made Milton Friedman a household name.
Although much of his trailblazing work was done on price theory—the theory that explains how prices are determined in individual markets—Friedman is popularly recognised for monetarism. 
Defying Keynes and most of the academic establishment of the time, Friedman presented evidence to resurrect the quantity theory of money—the idea that the price level depends on the money supply. 
In Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, published in 1956, Friedman stated that in the long run, increased monetary growth increases prices but has little or no effect on output. In the short run, he argued, increases in money supply growth cause employment and output to increase, and decreases in money supply growth have the opposite effect.
Friedman’s solution to the problems of inflation and short-run fluctuations in employment and real GNP was a so-called money-supply rule. If the Federal Reserve Board were required to increase the money supply at the same rate as real GNP increased, he argued, inflation would disappear. 
Friedman’s monetarism came to the forefront when, in 1963, he and Anna Schwartz coauthored Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, which contends that the Great Depression was the result of the Federal Reserve’s ill-conceived monetary policies. 
Upon receipt of the unpublished manuscript submitted by the authors, the Federal Reserve Board responded internally with a lengthy critical review. Such was their agitation that the Fed governors discontinued their policy of releasing minutes from the board’s meetings to the public. 
Additionally, they commissioned a counterhistory to be written (by Elmus R. Wicker) in the hope of detracting from Monetary History.
Friedman’s book has had a substantial influence on the economics profession. One measure of that influence is the change in the treatment of Monetary Policy given by MIT Keynesian Paul Samuelson in his best-selling textbook, Economics. 
In the 1948 edition Samuelson wrote dismissively that “few economists regard Federal Reserve monetary policy as a panacea for controlling the business cycle.” But in 1967 Samuelson said that monetary policy had “an important influence” on total spending. 
The 1985 edition, coauthored with Yale’s William Nordhaus, states, “Money is the most powerful and useful tool that macroeconomic policymakers have,” adding that the Fed “is the most important factor” in making policy.
Throughout the 1960s, Keynesians—and mainstream economists generally—had believed that the government faced a stable long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation—the so-called Phillips Curve
In this view the government could, by increasing the demand for goods and services, permanently reduce unemployment by accepting a higher inflation rate. But in the late 1960s, Friedman (and Columbia University’s Edmund Phelps) challenged this view. 
Friedman argued that once people adjusted to the higher inflation rate, unemployment would creep back up. To keep unemployment permanently lower, he said, would require not just a higher, but a permanently accelerating inflation rate (see Phillips curve).
The stagflation of the 1970s — rising inflation combined with rising unemployment — gave strong evidence for the Friedman-Phelps view and swayed most economists, including many Keynesians. 
Again, Samuelson’s text is a barometer of the change in economists’ thinking. 
The 1967 edition indicates that policymakers faced a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. The 1980 edition says there was less of a trade-off in the long run than in the short run. The 1985 edition says there is no long-run trade-off.

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