SCO-BRICS 2015 Summit

The Diplomat 
june 8, 2015

Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis there has been a clear shift in the tectonic plates of global geopolitics. An increasingly assertive Russia and China are challenging the U.S.-dominated order in a myriad of ways, but the actual contours of the emerging multipolar world are still hazy. 

On the one hand, as Huiyun Feng describes in her recent article for The Diplomat, the two opposing sides seem to be set. The Russia-China Entente and its coterie of Eurasian autocracies seems to be a genuine, lasting phenomenon. Meanwhile, the G-7 is unified in its opposition to Moscow, while the United States has reinforced its Pacific alliances with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. 

On the other hand, the path of middle powers such as India, Iran, Brazil, Turkey, and Indonesia remains uncertain. Despite prodding from the United States none of these countries joined Washington in imposing sanctions against Russia and all are interested in profiting from China’s evolving “One Belt, One Road” initiative.

The allegiances of these middle powers may well become clearer during the upcoming BRICS/Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Heads of State Council meeting in Ufa, set to take place from July 8 – 10.

Russia: Unbent, Unbowed, and Just a Little Bit Broken

First and foremost the Ufa summit is an opportunity for Russia, which in 2014-2015 holds the rotating presidency of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, to showcase its resilience. 

Almost exactly a year after the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine led the United States, Germany, and other Western European states to impose harsh economic sanctions, the Russian economy remains fragile. With oil prices mired in the $50-60 range since January, the Kremlin is quickly eating through its international reserves.

Still, although Russia is certainly in recession, the Russian economy is not exactly “in tatters” as U.S. President Barack Obama famously put it in his State of the Union speech last February. 

The ruble has stabilized and countries such as Argentina, Israel, Turkey, Mongolia, and China have filled some of the void left by the disappearance of Western products and investments. The last (and only other) time that the SCO and BRICS combined their summits was back in 2009, in the midst of the global financial crisis, when the two organizations held simultaneous meetings in Ekaterinburg. T

hat summer marked the nadir of Russia’s post-crisis financial slide and the economy rebounded soon thereafter, a feat that Moscow hopes to replicate next fall. But whereas the Ekaterinburg conference was a rather prosaic affair, the meetings in Ufa promise to culminate with several major agreements.

The SCO Expands into South Asia

The SCO has not accepted any new members since its initial formation in 2001. Nonetheless, the organization has managed to expand rapidly by granting states “observer” and “dialogue partner” status – a sort of “Cursus Honorum” on the way to a full membership. 

Currently, five states – Afghanistan, Mongolia, Iran, India, and Pakistan – have observer status and two appear to be on the precipice of becoming full members. In fact, it is widely expected that India and Pakistan will be elevated to full membership during the Ufa Summit. 

The dual assent prevents any hard feelings in either Islamabad or New Delhi while also maintaining the tenuous balance between Beijing and Moscow within the SCO. Pakistan has had a close partnership with China since the 1960s, whereas India has traditionally been considered a friend of Russia (although Narendra Modi’s recent manic diplomacy has made it seem that India, the traditional leader of the Non-Aligned movement, is actually aligned with everyone). 

Iran, which applied for membership years ago but has thus far been denied due to the UN Security Council sanctions on its nuclear program, may also be on the verge of being accepted, pending a successful resolution to the nuclear talks with the United States. 

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was in Moscow on July 3for the SCO meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and has promised that “top leadership” will represent Iran at the Ufa Summit. Mongolia remains skeptical about becoming a full member due to worries about the impact such a step would have on Ulaanbaatar’s relationship with its “third neighbors” (the U.S., Japan, and South Korea), but recent improvements in Sino-Russian-Mongolian relations may change this strategic calculation.

Match Made in Heaven?

The SCO was initially developed exclusively for security purposes but, as a recently released report by the Russian International Affairs Council indicates, the organization has slowly taken on economic dimensions as well. 

Next to SCO expansion, the biggest question to be resolved at the Ufa summit is whether a formal integration between China’s Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) can be formed under the auspices of the SCO. 

Both China and Russia seem to support this integration, but the actual mechanism for the institutionalization of the nascent project remains elusive. Still, work on the development of such a framework has already begun. 

For example, on May 15 the transport ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization approved a protocol on the creation of a joint commission to promote international cargo transportation by motor vehicles traveling through the SCO countries. Many more such incremental steps need to be taken before anything resembling a modern infrastructure network can unify the ancient caravan routes of the old Silk Road. 

Another elusive economic goal is the formation of the long-debated SCO Development Bank, a project that was initially proposed by China but stymied by Russia. Alexander Gabuev described this tussle in an excellent column published by Russia in Global Affairs last March. 

When Beijing first proposed an SCO bank back in 2009, Moscow’s policymakers were concerned that the creation of such an institution would lead to Chinese dominance of Central Asian finances and were also mildly insulted by Chinese insistence that the bank be headquartered in either Beijing or Shanghai. 

However, as Gabuev explains, China’s role as lender to Central Asian states has grown exponentially over the last five years and now it is Moscow itself that seeks Chinese financial support. Under these shifting circumstances, Russia could benefit from having a secure mechanism for the guarantee of loans rather than having to deal with the tough Chinese negotiators through bilateral talks. 

Unfortunately for the Russians, it might already be too late as the tables have turned and Beijing has demurred on setting up the bank, claiming that the recently established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank) render an SCO bank redundant.

Whither BRICS? 

The 7th BRICS summit meeting in Ufa promises to unveil a roadmap for the development of BRICS as an organization until 2025. What that will actually look like is anyone’s guess, as there are deep-seated differences among the five members about what BRICS is and what it should become. 

These cleavages were on display during the BRICS Academic Forum (an annual event held several months prior to the leadership summit) that was held in Moscow in May. According to Mikhail Korostikov, a Russian scholar who attended the event, the acronym CRIBS is more appropriate for the current views of the five members. 

Russia and China occupy a “leftist,” anti-Western flank, South Africa and Brazil are “rightist” – preferring to continue working within the confines of a world regulated by Western institutions – and India is left in the middle calling for the freedom to work with all sides or, as one member of the Indian delegation called it, “free love.”

Despite these differences, BRICS remains a unique forum that brings together five vastly different countries from four continents without the participation of the United States or any other member of the G-7. The “BRICS roadmap to 2025” is sure to be read with interest by policymakers throughout the world.

Welcome Eurasia?

Dmitry Trenin’s 2002 book “The End of Eurasia” encouraged Russia to join the West and integrate with the European Union. The monograph sold well and made Trenin, then a leading member of the “Atlanticist” school of thought in Russian academic circles, a popular figure in Western capitals. 

Now, thirteen years later, Trenin is pushing for a Sino-Russian anti-Western alliance. The irony of Trenin’s shift has not been lost on Western observers of Russian politics. As it turns out, Eurasia is, in fact, very far from finished. 

The growing popularity of “Eurasianism” as an ideology in Russia has been well documented and explained by scholars such as Marlene Laruelle and Jeffrey Mankoff, but the practical components of this perspective are just now beginning to be developed.

The Valdai Club’s recently published report “Toward the Great Ocean 3: Creating Central Eurasia,” describes this process in detail and calls for the creation of a variety of new international mechanisms to complement the SCO. 

The authors of the report conclude that the Siberian Federal Region, particularly the cities of Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, and Irkustsk can be seen as the “heartland of the heartland” – the core of Eurasia. 

Next month, the BRICS/SCO meetings in Ufa, several thousand miles east of this alleged nucleus, will begin to determine whether or not the Eurasian dream can eventually become reality.

fonte: The Diplomat

Why the BRICS will remain an important force in world affairs in 2015 and beyond

The Diplomat
17 Mar 2015

Oliver Stuenkel is an assistant professor of International Relations at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in São Paulo and the author of a new book The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. He recently spoke with Justin McDonnell about the role of the BRICS in the international system in 2015 and beyond.

Why are the BRICS important in 2015?

Despite the economic crises in Russia, Brazil and South Africa, the BRICS grouping remains by far the most important political grouping without Western participation. For leaders from Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa, the 7th BRICS Summit, to be held in Russia in July, is the most important diplomatic event of the year. 

The grouping’s continued strength and capacity to innovate – marked by frequent high-level meetings and the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) – shows that Western analysts have generally been wrong in their assessments that the BRICS countries were too different from each other to agree on anything. 

Considering that the first BRICS’ leaders summit took place only six years ago, it is notable how much the grouping has achieved, particularly when it comes to intra-BRICS ties. For example, in a controversial move, the BRICS jointly criticized the West for attempting to exclude Russia from the G20, and their stance is likely to protect Russia for complete economic and political isolation. 

The BRICS grouping has thus turned into a key element of international affairs. And yet, both Western media policy analysts still know very little about the topic.

Are the BRICS a force for good in the world or simply an obstructionist bloc creating a more fragmented system?

Above all, the BRICS grouping has been very important in strengthening ties between its members, which have been traditionally weak. For example, despite China being Brazil’s most important trading partner, Brazilian society and government still know very little about China. 

The BRICS grouping is an important mechanism to help correct that, through providing an institutionalized yearly meeting between the presidents, ministers of Foreign Affairs, Education, Agriculture, Health, National Security, and many other areas. In the same way, there are now regular meetings between think tanks, mayors and academics, who had previously very little knowledge of each other. 

While such things take time, the grouping has been an important element in slowly adjusting each countries’ overall perspectives to a more multipolar world.

None of these activities or the BRICS’ joint positions in global affairs have been directed against the United States or Europe. Of course, correcting the distribution of votes at the IMF and the World Bank has led to resistance in Washington and Brussels, but they will ultimately strengthen existing institutions by making them more legitimate. 

The creation of the New Development Bank the Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA) are not meant to weaken existing institutions, in the same way that the African Development Bank does not rival the World Bank. The CRA is embedded in the IMF-led system, so worries that the BRICS constitute a direct and immediate challenge to the existing order are premature.

U.S. opposition or suspicion of such structures underline how insincere U.S. foreign policy makers’ calls on rising powers to become “responsible stakeholders” is – after all, there are few better examples of emerging powers “stepping up to the plate” than providing billions of dollars for infrastructure development in the developing world. 

While surprising to some in Washington, it is obvious that rising powers want to assume responsibility on their own terms rather than accepting the rules and norms established by U.S.-led institutions.

It looks like sufficient steps are being made to bring the New Development Bank (NDB) into operation by 2016. What implications will that have for the global financial landscape as well as interaction with established global institutions?

The New Development Bank is merely one of several new initiatives – most of which are Chinese-led – that will slowly help adapt global structures to the new reality of multipolarity. Since all the BRICS countries continue to fully support existing institutions, immediate implications will be limited. 

Yet, the successful creation of alternative banks provides emerging powers with more leverage to accelerate their demands in the World Bank and the IMF, since they can, in theory, threaten to abandon existing structures. The creation of the NDB thus points to a future with a larger number of important institutions that are not Western-led.

Russia will hold the seventh BRICS summit this July in Ufa. The host nation gets to set the agenda. Given the collapse of the ruble, falling oil prices, and weakening ties with the EU and the U.S. over the Ukraine crisis, what might we expect Russia to bring to the table?

Increasingly anti-Western, Russia will introduce a series of measures during the summit discussions that are likely to generate strong criticism in the West, such as arguing for the UN’s International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to replace the U.S. government as the ICANN overseer. Many critics of this idea say that it would allow authoritarian regimes to challenge the open Internet. 

China is supportive of the idea, and both India and South Africa have expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo, even though their position is not as clear as Russia’s. Brazil, however, is unlikely to go along, considering its leadership on the matter at the 2014 NetMundial in São Paulo.

In several other areas, Russia may seek to politicize the BRICS meeting further and use it as an anti-Western platform. That strategy will cause resistance among the other members that have no interest in unnecessarily antagonizing Washington. 

In fact, Brazilian foreign policy makers will be careful not to admit any overly strongly worded language in the final summit declaration that may imperil a key goal for Brasília in 2015: repairing frayed ties with the United States. Even without imposing his Internet-related views on the other BRICS countries, the summit will be a success for Vladimir Putin. 

Within a few days, the Russian president will host not only the BRICS leaders, but also heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). One year after the Winter Olympics, Russia will continue to successfully resist Western attempts to turn it into a pariah. Finally, further details about the launch of the NDB will be released.

What can the BRICS do to encourage a peaceful solution to the crisis in Ukraine and help Russia return to a more stable economy?

In a clear choice for realpolitik, the BRICS countries adopted a passive stance vis-à-vis the crisis (essentially protecting Russia from complete isolation), and they have been handsomely rewarded for it. 

Russian imports from Brazil, India and China have grown since the beginning of Western sanctions. The historic gas deal between China and Russia had been years in the making, but China clearly benefitted from the Russia’s lack of other options. Western attempts to isolate countries such as Russia drive the new pariahs into the Chinese orbit without generating any significant cost for Beijing. 

The BRICS are thus helping Russia prevent an even bigger economic fallout or a product shortage at home. At the same time, they have played virtually no role in helping find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Ukraine. 

Particularly from China’s point of view, current global dynamics are almost ideal: Forced to focus on Russia, the United States pays only limited attention to China’s rise and increasingly global projection, allowing Beijing to remain under the radar for more time. Critics are of course right to point out that in this specific case the BRICS are not playing a constructive role that could help end the conflict.

These countries are very different from one another on various fronts and issues. Isn’t forging a cohesive vision a very serious challenge, if not downright impossible?

For most observers the BRICS is too disparate to be a significant category. In the international media, the BRICSS have therefore been routinely described as “a disparate quartet,”  a “motley crew,”  or as an “odd grouping.” 

The idea of the BRICS as a bloc, according to this narrative, was deeply flawed and the BRICS member countries were too diverse to ever form a coherent group. Yet a key uniting element was often overlooked: All four initial member countries (prior to South Africa’s accession in December 2010) have global ambitions – a global project, however vaguely defined, voiced frequently. 

They also have a sense of entitlement absent in other emerging powers such as Mexico or Indonesia (Turkey may be the only exception), which makes them articulate these visions with a sense of naturalness that often baffles Western observers. The underlying message here is: We should have a key role in global affairs not because of what we do, but who we are. 

It is here that the BRICS grouping is indeed an interesting political category – for example, there are no emerging powers outside of it that have a systematic engagement with the UN Security Council, either as permanent members or committed candidates. As Celso Amorim, Brazil’s former Foreign Minister, argued, it was “time to start reorganizing the world in the direction that the overwhelming majority of mankind expects and needs.”  

To his mind, the BRICS countries were to play a key role in that process.

It is of course true that the BRICS disagree on many issues – as would be expected from five unique countries in different parts of the world. It is also true that they regard themselves as rivals, and Sino-Indian ties are the most complicated of all. 

Yet frequent disagreement does not keep countries from cooperating or being part of the same clubs. Germany and Italy are fiercely opposed when it comes to UN Security Council reform, and Germany and France sharply disagreed over military intervention in Libya. 

The United Kingdom and France, for their part, held opposing views on such important matters as the military intervention in Iraq. The United States opposed China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Britain was the first Western country to join it. And yet, not a single analyst argued that these disagreements showed that NATO or the EU were bad ideas.

If you could see as far ahead as 2030, do you think the global governance structure will continue to look and be led by established Western powers or will the BRICS unified efforts reshape the international system in a way that more appropriately reflects and addresses their norms, values, and priorities?

Policy makers in the Global South will continue to invest in Western-dominated structures and push for their reform. Yet provided that China and India (the two dominant actors in the BRICS grouping) can prevent domestic political turmoil and maintain moderate growth in the coming years, they will quietly expand networks in many different areas, ready to engage those who do feel today’s institutions fail to satisfy their needs, or those who seek to increase autonomy from the United States. 

Several of the already existing alternative institutions have arguably positive effects on development, mainly in Asia and Africa. So I think we’ll see a far more diversified global order, with the presence of strong Chinese-led institutions that will play a strong role in global affairs. 

Yet Western and non-Western institutions will not necessarily be opposed to each other. China will continue to be part of the Western-dominated World Bank, and several Western powers will follow Britain’s lead and join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

While emerging powers agree with fundamental issues such as international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, and the rule of law, they consider, to differing degrees, today’s order as flawed and frequently undermined by the system’s creators. 

Brazil, South Africa and India in particular oppose the implicit and explicit hierarchies of international institutions and the many privileges often enjoyed by great powers in international deliberations. 

China, while more privileged, equally resents the U.S. advantages hard-wired into today’s order. It is thus skepticism about the operationalization of liberal norms, rather than the goals and values that guide them that shapes the BRICS’ relationship to today’s global order.

fonte: The Diplomat

BRICS: Is there a cost to being a BRICS member ?

The debate in Brazil: Is there a cost to being a BRICS member?

Post Western World

Oliver Stuenkel

26 Jul 2014

Those who argue that the BRICS grouping is bad for Brazil's national interest generally misunderstand it as an ideological, anti-American alliance. 

Yet global projects without Western participation are merely a symbol of a more politically multipolar global order, and they do not undermine Brazil's historical ties to Europe or the United States. 

The example of internet governance shows that the BRICS grouping does nothing to reduce Brazil's independence and capacity to disagree with China and Russia when doing so is in Brazil's national interest. 

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For the first time, the rise of the BRICS grouping has turned into a key element of the foreign policy debate in Brazil. As I have previously pointed out, being part of the BRICS grouping generates considerable benefits for Brazil, facilitating the diversification of its partnerships and helping it adapt to a more multipolar global order. 

Brazil no longer needs to choose between leaning more towards the United States or the developing world - it must have strong ties to both established and emerging powers alike. Most importantly, a more institutionalized BRICS grouping will provide policy makers in Brasília with a constant channel of communication to China's political leadership. 

Given Brazil's limited diplomatic presence in Beijing and its growing economic dependence on China, such direct access is priceless.

Yet many policy analysts in Brazil still argue that the grouping is useless or, worse, that it hurts Brazil's national interest. However, their arguments are generally an uncritical repetition of ideas produced in the United States, mostly pointing to the many differences between emerging powers. 

For example, in a recent column critical of the BRICS grouping in Folha de São Paulo, Alexandre Schwartsmann argues

The demographic profile of each BRICS member could not be more different: Half of the population in India and South Africa is younger than 25, compared with 38 years in Russia  and 34 years in China (in Brazil, it is 29 years). We have, therefore, young countries, aging countries and Brazil in the middle of its demographic transition. 

While demographers are certain to find such figures of great interest, it is entirely unclear why they should matter in the context of Brazil's foreign policy. 

Why should Brazil choose its partners based on their demographic profile? If demography mattered as much as Schwartsmann implies, should Brazil stop cooperating with Japan, Germany and Italy, three countries with vastly different demographic profiles from Brazil? 

There is, to my knowledge, not a single study that shows that countries with similar demographic profiles are more likely to cooperate. So why mention it?

Schwartsmann, along with many others, also mentions GDP per capita, pointing out that Russia's GDP per capita stands at U$ 20,000 compared to India's U$ 3000. Yet strangely enough, nobody cared much about GDP per capita when NATO, which includes Norway (with a GDP per capita of around U$ 100,000) accepted Albania, which has a GDP per capita of less than U$ 4000. 

Similar discrepancies exist in the European Union, Mercosur, ASEAN, the AU, the UN, the G20 or pretty much every international grouping one can think of. 

There is a long history of successful cooperation between countries that are very different from each other - just think of Turkey's NATO membership, the profound economic embrace between the United States and China, or US military alliances with countries such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. One may be very critical of some of these, but certainly not because they included countries of differing demographics or per capita income.

In the same way, frequent disagreement does not keep countries from cooperating or being part of the same clubs. Germany and Italy are fiercely opposed when it comes to UN Security Council reform, and Germany and France sharply disagreed over military intervention in Libya. 

The United Kingdom and France, for their part, held opposing views on such important matters as the military intervention in Iraq. And yet, not a single analyst argued that these disagreements showed that NATO or the EU were bad ideas.

Criticizing the BRICS grouping based on the differences between its members distorts the purpose of the project and implicitly accepts a US-centric with-us-or-against-us world view.

It is worth remembering that one of the major reasons for the endurance of US hegemony has been its capacity to avoid any serious cooperation between powers that could challenge US leadership. 

As a consequence, the United States has generally attempted to keep countries from assuming regional leadership by bolstering their foes. This is most visible in Asia, where the United States actively cooperates with Japan, India and others to tie down China in its neighbourhood. 

Continued tension between China and its neighbors is very much in the United States' interest. An alliance between China and India, on the other hand, would pose a challenge to US control of the region.

The United States is equally interested in keeping the BRICS grouping superficial and disunited. During the 2nd BRICS Summit in Brasília in 2010, a US-American diplomat privately asked me "what the US could do to weaken the BRICS grouping and convince Brazil that it was too different from Asia's emerging powers to establish any institutionalized platform."  

One of the strategies has been precisely to depict the BRICS grouping as an anti-Western alliance, something that has naturally caused a stir in Brazil. Yet it is not: Brazil continues, along with all the other BRICS members, to cooperate with both the World Bank and the IMF, and there is no sign that the BRICS grouping weakens Brazil's ties to the US or Europe in any way. 

Quite to the contrary, decision-makers in Washington, DC are likely to take Brazil more seriously because of it, as some in the United States believe Xi Jinping is attempting to turn BRICS into a platform from which to advance China’s global agenda.

Leading voices in international affairs based in the United States (in both the media and academia) have systematically criticized the BRICS grouping since its transformation into a political grouping in 2009. 

It is no coincidence that it is in Brazil, the only BRICS country whose newspapers merely copy and translate most articles on international affairs from Western authors, where opionion makers are most skeptical of the BRICS concept. 

Yet, as I have pointed out before, being a BRICS member has no cost. Brazil's neutral reaction to the Crimean Crisis was not, as some analysts had suggested, a consequence of its BRICS membership. 

With regards to internet governance, Brazil stance strongly diverges from that of the other BRICS, showing that Brazil does not feel obliged to align with Chinese or Russian position unless it wants to.

Most importantly, the BRICS do not seek to establish an EU-like association that is in any way anti-Western or anti-American. Those who characterize it as such blindly buy into the Western-centric narrative that any global project without Western participation must automatically be directed against the West. In a multipolar world, however, such projects will be increasingly common.

Those in Brazil who are skeptical of the BRICS grouping have yet to find a single instance where Brazil's membership has hurt the country's national interest. They are unlikely to find one soon.

fonte: Post Western World

India: The odd BRICS out

The Diplomat

By Stephen Junor

September 02, 2014

The BRICS nations have rapidly evolved from a group of emerging economies into political contenders in a new world, driven by the search for an alternative to Western hegemony. 

Recent Western failures have also helped to launch the BRICS concept as an alternative, and has possibly pushed the countries closer together than they may have initially intended. 

There are also differences (the China-India border disputes for example) that would have seriously tested the relationship between other countries, but for now they are responsible for the multi-polar world that appears to be emerging.

The Western approach toward BRICS has generally been one of skepticism, but when it comes to India there is a conspicuously different portrayal in the media compared to the rest of the countries. 

Although the recent U.S.-Africa summit suggests friendly relations, South Africa has always seen itself as a member of the global South and champions countries that don’t acquiesce to U.S. dominance. The conflict between the U.S. (somewhat supported by much of Europe) and Russia is well-known, and the media consistently highlights the conflict and difference between the U.S. and China. 

American interference in Latin America has made relations between Brazil and the U.S. touchy, and the rhetoric from Brazil in the wake of NSA spying last year was scathing. 

Despite relations taking a hit last year when Indian diplomat Devyani Khobragade was arrested in New York, U.S. and Western media have generally been friendly toward India, exemplified by President Barack Obama’s invitation to newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi to visit the U.S., despite Modi previously being blocked from the U.S. over his failure to stop sectarian violence as Gujarat’s chief minister in 2002, when more than 1,000 people were killed.

It is likely that the U.S. views India as a potential foothold in Asia. India is often heralded in the Western media as the world’s largest democracy, in an attempt to provide common ground and a nod of disapproval to the likes of China and Russia. 

In contrast to the other BRICS members, Indian elites aspire to the wealth and influence of the U.S., and it is only natural that this aspiration would manifest itself in the politics of the country. Modi is a proponent of free market capitalism and this bodes well for relations with the U.S., which will see him as an accessible figure.

There are further important differences between India and the rest of the BRICS nations. World Bank data shows that India’s GDP per capita severely lags behind the rest at around $1,500, four times less than China and South Africa, seven times less than Brazil and almost 10 times less than Russia. 

India hasn’t replicated the rapid growth of the other BRICS countries since the turn of the millennium, and this is also reflected in a slower reduction in the poverty gap. Just under 25 percent of the population still live on less than $2 a day, compared to 10 percent or less for the other countries. Such a severe development problem will hinder Indian growth in the near future and will see it fall further behind. Modi will be expected to implement reforms that improve growth and lift hundreds of millions out of crippling poverty.

Growth alone will not solve the poverty problem in India however. When it comes to literacy rates in adults, the 2011 Indian census recorded a figure of 74 percent while the rest of the BRICS nations record over 90 percent. Literacy among women is even lower at 64 percent. 

Infrastructure in India is also sub-standard. An overburdened transport systems and insufficient electricity grids that are overly reliant on coal contribute to the poverty problem while hindering growth. Rapid urbanization is also putting pressure on these systems, making the problem more acute. 

India also has a digital problem as only 15 percent of the population uses the internet, compared to upwards of 40 percent for the other BRICS. Connectivity is important, particularly for those often marginalized in society, as evidence points towards benefits for education and health.

India has a distinctive set of problems that the other BRICS countries have largely moved beyond. Given the political and economic clout of the BRICS collective, India could soon find itself left behind within the group.

Indeed the statistics above and the obvious clout of China and Russia suggest that India may lack influence within the group already, despite efforts to spread power within the recently announced New Development Bank.

This is where the U.S. could become more influential with India. In a recent interview with The Diplomat, Sadanand Dhume, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and Wall Street Journalcolumnist, said that India would be foolish to join an anti-Western bloc as India’s rise is inherently tied to the West. 

Given the popular view that the BRICS are opposed to the West, India finds itself in the unique position of being a part of the BRICS collective as well as having overtly friendly relations with the U.S., a relationship that is likely to further improve in the future as Modi visits the U.S. and ties strengthen.

India will need to manage its relationships carefully, as it will not want to find itself isolated from either the U.S. or the BRICS. It is also important that India doesn’t become geopolitically caught between the two sides: Any point of tension between the West and an individual BRICS country could reflect on the rest of the group. 

Indeed if India wants to achieve strong growth and solve its development crisis, then it will need to harness relationships with both sides. 

The next few years will be crucial for Indian development, and as the international political situation slowly evolves, it will be interesting to see how India locates itself in relation to the West and the other BRICS countries.

fonte: The Diplomat

BRICS Bank taking off: money for energy

COKE BROTHERS

The new $50 billion BRICS bank will finance a wave of heavily polluting coal plants the West wouldn't touch. And that's not all bad.

Keith Johnson

The BRICS countries' announcement last week that they will create a new development bank comes as a frontal challenge to the Western-dominated international financial system. It could also boost financing for coal-fired power plants around the world, something most international economic institutions, such as the World Bank, and many Western countries spurn.

Unshackling fresh money for coal could help bring poor countries what they most sorely need -- energy -- and jumpstart serious investment in advanced clean-coal technology that the whole world needs.

The New Development Bank won't be fully formed until next year, its policy charters have yet to be written, and pundits have teed off on the bank's prospects for success. But many observers believe that despite teething pains, the new kid on the block will grow up to be a real alternative to the World Bank, IMF, and the like and bring Beijing's investment focus to poorer countries.

If nothing else, the bank's creation reflects middle-income countries' frustration with the West's refusal to recapitalize the World Bank, keeping their financial leverage limited. And it comes at a time when even France has joined Russia and China in calling for an alternative international currency to curb Washington's ability to use the dollar's ubiquity to further its policy agenda.

More importantly, the New Development Bank will take a page from the BRICS countries' own recent history with infrastructure-fueled investments, said Kevin Gallagher, an associate professor studying economic development at Boston University. He said the new bank would likely finance projects similar to those backed by the institutions it is modeled on, the Brazilian National Development Bank and the China Development Bank.

"They are going to put a premium on infrastructure and energy, which was the World Bank's model in the 1970s, which got them in trouble with local environmentalists," Gallagher said.

It's safe to assume that the $50 billion bank won't tar coal with the brush used by the World Bank, the U.S. Treasury, and the other pillars of developmental finance.

Most of the BRICS countries -- Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa -- invest heavily in coal. China uses as much coal as the rest of the world combined, while India's economy is powered by coal. South Africa and Russia are big coal exporters.

"You can definitely see why poorer countries, and the BRICS nations especially, would be interested in having new institutions to fund these types of energy projects without the red tape that is increasingly coming" from Western governments and Western-dominated development banks, said Alex Trembath, an energy and climate analyst at the Breakthrough Institute. His technology-focused environmental think tank recently studied energy options for less-developed countries.

The World Bank, for example, has all but banned underwriting investments in coal-fired power plants, except in "rare circumstances." The U.S. last year echoed that stance, following a summertime pledge from President Barack Obama to keep public money out of dirty power overseas. The U.K., Nordic countries, and others soon followed.

"No doubt the BRICS will take a more flexible stance, certainly in their energy strategies, when it comes to fossil fuels," said Scott Morris, an expert on international financial institutions at the Center for Global Development.

And although that's exactly what people concerned about rising global emissions of greenhouse gases and temperatures don't want to see, it may not be the environmental cataclysm they envision.

Poor countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, need energy to power development and growth; coal is a cheap, readily available source for plenty of places that literally can't keep the lights on. South Africa, for example, struggled mightily with the World Bank's environmental strictures that made it difficult to build a big new coal plant there; now rolling blackouts are a problem. And South Africa is the success story. The rest of Africa has a much bigger energy-access problem.

That highlights a paradox with the rich countries' decision to discourage financing coal plants on environmental grounds: Many of those nations are simultaneously trying to improve the energy prospects of the poorest countries.

The Obama administration, for example, launched the "Power Africa" initiative last summer but left one big source of power off the table while favoring clean, renewable energy instead. International financial support for wind power and solar power checks the green box but doesn't always light the fuse box.

"There's this notion in the environmental world that if we just stop funding coal out of the World Bank, then we're not going to have coal and everyone's going to have wind and solar," said Armond Cohen, the executive director of the Clean Air Task Force.

"The disconnect between the actual power requirements of the BRICS and other developing countries and what people in Washington think is doable is almost surreal," he added. "So this could be a very healthy wake-up call."

Even from the perspective of tackling climate change, the BRICS bank could ultimately end up fighting the good fight. For a decade, the United States, China, and other nations have sought the Holy Grail of clean energy: how to burn cheap and abundant mountains of coal without frying the planet. Technically, it's not difficult. 

New power plants can be constructed and existing ones retrofitted to trap carbon emissions. That carbon can then be pumped underground, rather than into the atmosphere. One new plant in Missouri does just that.

The problem is the price. Carbon capture and storage, or CCS, is very expensive. The plants devour even more coal because they are slightly less efficient. And storing the stuff requires pipelines, underground reservoirs, and other infrastructure all costlier than a smokestack.

In the absence of any real cost for emitting carbon -- such as a carbon tax or a trading scheme with teeth -- the economics of CCS simply don't work. Financing such programs is very problematic, as investment bank Société Générale has noted. Other than that plant in Missouri, there are only a handful of facilities worldwide even close to commercially ready.

That's where the billions of dollars in potential coal financing from the new bank could make a difference, by pushing CCS out of the experimental nest and into flight. One way to make clean coal cheaper is to build more plants using it, creating economies of scale and driving research into improved technology.

China desperately wants to make CCS a reality since about three-quarters of its electricity comes from coal, and capping emissions has become something of a national mission. Beijing's and Washington's CCS collaboration is a rare point of bilateral cooperation. China is even pouring money into a project in Texas.

"For CCS, that's a multilateral investment no-brainer, given the amount of coal we have today and the amount of coal that we're expected to deploy in the future," said Breakthrough's Trembath, noting that the New Development Bank has yet to outline its investment strategy.

The CATF's Cohen notes that Western finance bans on new coal plants have had only a limited impact on the deployment of dirty energy, so the self-imposed limitations don't always achieve their goals of a carbon-free developing world. China, Russia, Japan, and Germany have offered national financing for coal projects around the world. The prospect of multilateral development cash flowing into path-breaking coal plants is not unappealing.

"The hear-no-evil, see-no-evil attitude of the West with regards to fossil fuel is futile," said Cohen. He noted that China now has a fleet of coal-fired power plants triple the size of the American coal fleet; Africa, Latin America, and South Asia are also betting on coal when they can.

"Let's get on with it, but figure out how to do it right."

Jamila Trindle contributed to this article.

Nelson Almeida - AFP - Getty

fonte: Foreign Policy

VI BRICS Summit

Começou, nesta segunda-feira (14), em Fortaleza (CE), a VI Cúpula do BRICS. 

Na segunda, foram realizadas as reuniões dos ministros das Finanças, dos presidentes dos Bancos Centrais, dos ministros do Comércio e dos presidentes de bancos de desenvolvimento dos cinco países. Em paralelo, ocorre também o foro empresarial e o encontro do Conselho Empresarial do BRICS.

Na terça-feira (15), os chefes de Estado assinam atos e em seguida acontece uma sessão plenária. Ao final do dia, os líderes seguirão para Brasília, onde acontecerá, na quarta-feira (16), o terceiro e último dia da Cúpula.

Entre os principais pontos a serem debatidos no encontro estão a formalização da proposta de criação do Banco de Desenvolvimento e do Arranjo Contingente de Reservas (CRA).

O banco conjunto terá como função financiar projetos de infraestrutura e sustentabilidade. A Instituição Financeira terá capital inicial de US$ 50 bilhões, sendo US$ 10 bilhões em recursos e US$ 40 bilhões em garantias. Depois da assinatura do acordo para sua criação, o banco terá que ser aprovado pelos parlamentos dos cinco países.

A presidência do banco, que será rotativa, e o local de sede serão definidas na cúpula, em Fortaleza, bem como o conselho de administração e outras questões técnicas.

O Brasil foi o único membro que não se candidatou a sediar o banco. As opções são Xangai (China), Joanesburgo (África do Sul), Moscou (Rússia) e Nova Delhi (Índia).

Já o fundo servirá para ajudar os países do bloco em caso de dificuldades com balanço de pagamentos. O capital inicial do fundo será de US$ 100 bilhões. A China entrará com US$ 41 bilhões; o Brasil, a Rússia e Índia com US$ 18 bilhões cada; e a África do Sul com US$ 5 bilhões.

Encontros Prévios

Nesta segunda (14), em Brasília, o governo brasileiro recebe o presidente da Rússia no Palácio do Planalto. A reunião busca estreitar laços e aumentar fluxo comercial entre os dois países.

Em 2013, a corrente de comércio entre as duas nações chegou a cerca de US$ 5,6 bilhões, segundo dados do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior (Mdic), e a meta é ampliar as trocas para US$ 10 bilhões.

Ainda antes da realização da Cúpula, o governo brasileiro se reuniu com autoridades chinesas, na última sexta-feira (11). O encontro ocorreu na sede do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior (Mdic), e aconteceu dentro do âmbito da quarta reunião da Subcomissão de Indústria e Tecnologia da Informação da Comissão Sino-Brasileira de Alto Nível de Concertação e Cooperação (Cosban).

No evento, foram apresentadas propostas de cooperação entre os dois países nos setores industrial e de tecnologia da informação. Compareceram à reunião autoridades de governo e representantes de indústrias dos dois países. 

O Brasil pretende atrair investimentos chineses nas áreas de energia eólica e solar e cooperar no desenvolvimento de soluções tecnológicas para Internet das Coisas, (conceito que integra pessoas e objetos com a utilização de sensores wireless e de nanotecnologia).

Durante o encontro, as autoridades dos dois governos acordaram a criação de grupos de trabalho para discutir temas da indústria eletrônica e semicondutores, equipamentos pesados e automóveis. A próxima reunião da Subcomissão de Indústria e Tecnologia da Informação da Cosban será realizada na China, em 2015.

Atualmente, a China é o maior parceiro comercial do Brasil e possui investimentos voltados às áreas de energia, infraestrutura, telecomunicações, setor automotivo, bens de capital e eletroeletrônicos.

Novo site do MRE sobre a Cúpula de 2014 e sobre o BRICS

O Ministério das Relações Exteriores lançou um site sobre a 6a Cúpula dos BRICS e também com dados e informações sobre as cúpulas anteriores, bem com estatísticas e outras informações sobre o bloco. 

O site é bastante útil para estudos, pesquisas e análises pois concentra de forma organizada e oficial dados e informações sobre as relações e ações dos BRICS. 

Vale a pena dar visitada VI BRICS SUMMIT. 

fontes: 1 Portal Brasil

           2 Itamaraty - BRICS 6

Pirâmide etária e Bônus demográfico nos BRICs

A transformação da estrutura etária é um processo que ocorre concomitantemente ao fenômeno de transição demográfica. 

Na medida em que a esperança de vida sobe a as taxas de fecundidade caem a pirâmide etária reduz sua base, aumenta a parte do meio e, progressivamente, eleva o percentual do topo da estrutura etária. 

Essa transformação é conhecida como processo de envelhecimento populacional e acompanha inexoravelmente os avanços na transição demográfica. 

Duas medidas simples podem ilustrar o processo de envelhecimento populacional. A idade mediana é aquela que divide a população em duas metades iguais em termos etários. O índice de envelhecimento representa a quantidade de idosos (65 anos e mais) para cada cem crianças e adolescentes com idades entre 0 e 14 anos.

O gráfico 1 mostra a idade mediana dos quatro países que compõem os BRICs, em um período de cem anos. 

Em 1950, metade da população do Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China tinha menos de 19,2 anos, 25 anos, 21,3 anos e 23,9 anos, respectivamente. No ano 2000 as idades medianas já haviam passado para 25,3 anos, 36,5 anos, 22,7 anos e 30 anos. As projeções para 2050 indicam que o Brasil terá o dobro da idade mediana de 100 anos antes, isto é, metade da população brasileira terá menos de 40,4 anos, enquanto a outra metade terá mais de 40,4 anos. 

A Índia terá a menor idade mediana, mas 38,6 anos será um valor quase o dobro do que tinha em 1950, demonstrando que mesmo com uma fecundidade mais alta a Índia não ficará imune ao processo de envelhecimento. Rússia e China apresentarão envelhecimento mais avançado e atingirão uma idade mediana de cerca de 45 anos.

 Gráfico 1: Idade mediana (em anos) de Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China: 1950 - 2050

Fonte: Population Division of United Nations. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, 

 Disponível em:  http://esa,un,org/unpp, Visitado em: June 14, 2008.

O gráfico 2 mostra o índice de envelhecimento dos BRICs no período em questão.

Em 1950 existiam 7,2 idosos para cada 100 crianças e adolescentes entre 0 e 14 anos no Brasil, enquanto estes números eram de 21,4 idosos na Rússia, 8,4 na Índia e 13,4 na China.

As projeções indicam que a quantidade de idosos de 65 anos e mais ultrapassará o número de crianças adolescentes (0-14 anos) na Rússia após 2020 e após 2030 na China. 

O mesmo ocorrerá no Brasil por volta de 2050. A Índia será o único país dos BRICs que manterá uma percentagem de crianças e adolescentes maior do que a de idosos na metade do século XXI.

Gráfico 2: Índice de envelhecimento (IE) de Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China: 1950 a 2050

fonte: Population Division of United Nations. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, 
disponível em: http://esa,un,org/unpp, Visitado em: June 14, 2008. 








O gráfico 3 mostra as pirâmides etárias de 2000 e 2050 para os quatro países que compõe os BRICs, segundo os dados do Census Bureau dos EUA.   

A pirâmide etária do Brasil que em 1950 tinha uma base muito larga já apresentava uma retração nos três primeiros grupos quinquenais no ano 2000, indicando que a coorte que nasceu entre 1980 e 1985 no Brasil é a maior da história demográfico brasileira. 

Já em 2050, a pirâmide etária brasileira terá uma estrutura envelhecida e com todos os grupos etários abaixo de 50 anos menores do que o grupo imediatamente anterior.

A pirâmide etária da Rússia reflete as ondas demográficas que aconteceram na Rússia desde a Primeira Guerra Mundial, prosseguiram na Segunda Guerra e continuou com as alterações nas taxas de fecundidade, conforme fica claro na pirâmide 2000. 

Já pirâmide de 2050 fica claro a diminuição da população russa, pois todos os grupos etários abaixo dos 60 anos são muito menores do que as coortes nascidas antes de 1991. 

A pirâmide etária da Índia do ano 2000 ainda mostrava aquela forma piramidal típica das estruturas etárias jovens e de fecundidade alta. 

Com a queda da fecundidade na Índia deve ocorrer de forma lenta e não muito acentuada, a pirâmide etária de 2050 mostra grupos quinquenais, antes dos 50 anos, mais ou menos uniformes, mostrando que o meio da pirâmide estrá mais cheio e o topo ainda não terá o peso de uma estrutura muito envelhecida.      

Gráfico 3: Pirâmides etárias do Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China: 2000 e 2050

                    pirâmide etária Brasil 2000                                                              pirâmide etária Brasil 2050 

                      pirâmide etária Rússia 2000                                                           pirâmide etária Rússia 2050

                      pirâmide etária Índia 2000                                                              pirâmide etária Índia 2050

                      pirâmide etária China 2000                                                                pirâmide etária China 2050

A pirâmide etária da China, em 2000, mostra um grande grupo etário entre 30-34 anos que foi aquele que nasceu durante a Revolução Cultural da década de 1960.

Depois aparece um outro grande grupo com idade entre 10 e 14 anos que reflete a alta natalidade que ocorreu devido ao alto número de mulheres em período reprodutivo. Ou seja, mesmo com a queda da fecundidade houve aumento da natalidade devido ao grande número de mulheres em período reprodutivo, mostrando que os efeitos da alta fecundidade ocorrida durante a Revolução Cultural se propaga em ondas por longo tempo.

Na pirâmide etária chinesa de 2050 o maior grupo etário é exatamente o de 60-64 anos, isto é, aquele que tinha 10-14 anos em 2000. Abaixo deste grupo todos os outros são menores indicando a queda da fecundidade abaixo do nível de reposição, a redução da população a partir de 2025 e o processo de envelhecimento da China.

A análise dos dados anteriores mostram que os quatro países estão passando pelo processo de envelhecimento, mas antes de chegar a percentuais elevados de idosos na população, existe uma etapa intermediária em que a parte central da pirâmide cresce mais rápido do que as demais. 

Este período é conhecido como Janela de Oportunidade, Dividendo ou Bônus demográfico.

O Bônus Demográfico é um fenômeno que ocorre em um período de tempo no qual a estrutura etária da população apresenta menores razões de dependência (menos idosos, crianças e adolescentes) e maiores percentuais de população em idade produtiva, possibilitando que as condições demográficas atuem no sentido de incrementar o crescimento econômico e a melhoria das condições sociais dos cidadãos do país.

O bônus demográfico ocorre quando caem as razões de dependência (que é calculada pela divisão da população com idades entre 15-64 anos, pelo denominador formado pela soma da população dos grupos 0-14 anos e 65 anos e mais, o resultado multiplicado por 100).

Uma forma de medir esse fenômeno é considerar o bônus demográfico o período em que as razões de dependência estão abaixo dos percentuais da População em Idade Ativa (PIA).

O gráfico 4 mostra o bônus demográfico para o Brasil. 

Nota-se que o bônus começa em 1995 e deve acabar em 2055, quando a razão de dependência voltar a ultrapassar o percentual da PIA. 

 Gráfico 4: PIA e Razão de dependência total, crianças e idosos, Brasil: 1950 - 2050 

Fonte: Population Division of United Nations. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, 
Disponível em: http://esa,un,org/unpp, Visitado em: June 14, 2008.








O gráfico 5 mostra que a despeito de toda a propalada crise demográfica russa, a janela de oportunidade no país é a mais longa entre os 4 BRICs. 

Nota-se que no ano 2010 o bônus demográfico da Rússia deve atingir o seu ponto máximo (a diferença entre a razão de dependência e a PIA atinge 34,5%). 

O fim do bônus na Rússia deve ocorrer somente em 1950, quando a razão de dependência for maior do que o percentual da PIA. 

 Gráfico 5: PIA e Razão de dependência total, crianças e idosos, Rússia: 1950 - 2050

Fonte: Population Division of United Nations. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision,  
Disponível em: http://esa,un,org/unpp, Visitado em: June 14, 2008. 

O gráfico 6 mostra que o bônus demográfico na Índia começou muito recentemente, em 2005, e deve se prolongar para além de 2050. Isto ocorre devido ao processo mais lento de queda da fecundidade. Portanto, a Índia vai continuar apresentando uma estrutura etária favorável quando os demais países dos BRICs estiverem com uma estrutura mais envelhecida.

 Gráfico 6: PIA e Razão de dependência total, crianças e idosos, Brasil: 1950 - 2050

Fonte: Population Division of United Nations. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, Disponível em: http://esa,un,org/unpp, Visitado em: June 14, 2008. 









O gráfico 7 mostra o bônus demográfico na China que deve ser um pouco mais curto do que o brasileiro, mas será o que apresenta a maior janela entre os percentuais das razões de dependência e as da PIA. 

O bônus chinês começou em 1985 e deve acabar em 2035, época em que terá uma população bastante envelhecida. A vantagem da China é que o país tem mantido altas taxas de crescimento do PIB, do emprego e das condições de saúde e educação, ou seja, a política macroeconômica da China tem capitalizado o bônus demográfico de uma forma mais ampla do que os outros BRICs. 

 Gráfico 7: PIA e Razão de dependência total, crianças e idosos, Brasil: 1950 - 2050

Fonte: Population Division of United Nations. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision,
Disponível em: http://esa,un,org/unpp, Visitado em: June 14, 2008.








A China é o país que tem aproveitado melhor o momento demográfico favorável, pois tem gerado empregos em ritmo acelerado, mantido altas taxas de participação feminina no mercado de trabalho, avançado rapidamente nos níveis educacionais e de saúde.

Parece que os dirigentes chineses têm bastante consciência que esta abertura da janela de oportunidade não é para sempre e que as condições demográficas vão ficar mais difíceis a partir de 2035.

A Rússia é um país que contam com uma força de trabalho muito qualificada e tem mantido altas taxas de crescimento econômico, contribuindo, inclusive, para melhorar suas condições de saúde e ter ganhos de esperança de vida.

O Brasil tem aproveitado parcialmente o bônus demográfico pois não tem avançado suficientemente rápido com o crescimento econômico e com a inserção e qualificação da mão-de-obra.

A Índia ainda está se preparando para colher os frutos do bônus demográfico que deve ocorrer nas décadas vindouras.

De qualquer forma, os BRICs estão bem posicionados no quesito demográfico para enfrentar os desafios econômicos e sociais da contemporaneidade. 

José Eustáquio Diniz Alves 
Professor titular da ENCE e coordenador da Pós-graduação do IBGE 

fonte: Instituto Economia - UFRJ