L’avènement de l’Homme fort

The Conversation
Oliver Stuenkel
22 jan 2017

L’investiture de Donald Trump vendredi 20 janvier illustre parfaitement l’ampleur d’un phénomène qui pourrait bien donner le ton à la politique internationale dans les années à venir : la montée en puissance de l’Homme fort.

Le terme est utilisé de façon assez générale pour décrire les candidats au profil autoritaire, très portés sur l’ordre et la sécurité, déterminés à affaiblir les institutions et à concentrer le pouvoir dans l’exécutif.

Ces dirigeants ont tendance à rejeter le pluralisme, soit l’idée même que le pouvoir politique est distribué entre plusieurs acteurs, gouvernementaux et non-gouvernementaux. À la place, ils se proclament souvent comme seuls et uniques représentants du « peuple ».

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan en Turquie, Vladimir Poutine en Russie et Nicolás Maduro au Venezuela sont des exemples classiques d’hommes forts.

Interpellant facilement leurs opposants pour les qualifier d’antipatriotiques, ils les attaquent en les accusant de servir des « intérêts étrangers ». Ces politiciens entretiennent ainsi avec soin et constance une forme morale d’antipluralisme.

Les hommes forts se repaissent de la polarisation du pouvoir : une fois élus, les trois dirigeants cités ont décrit l’opposition comme illégitime, immorale et ont qualifié ses membres d’« ennemis du peuple ». Maduro a même appelé ceux qui ont voté contre lui des traîtres.

Cela ne vous rappelle-t-il pas un certain homme politique américain récemment élu ? Indice : en novembre 2016, Donald Trump a fait référence aux « millions d’électeurs illégaux » afin d’expliquer pourquoi il a perdu le vote populaire.

Bien sûr, certains hommes forts sont plus autoritaires que d’autres, et un cadre institutionnel ferme peut limiter leurs champs d’action.

Trump a-t-il fait son entrée dans le grand club des populistes autoritaires, et donc aux côtés de Poutine et d’Erdoğan ? Nous le découvrirons bientôt.

Une année de défis pour la démocratie

2017 verra donc l’arrivée au pouvoir d’hommes forts à Washington, Budapest, Moscou, Manille et Caracas. Que signifie cette situation, inédite dans l’histoire récente, pour la scène politique internationale ?

Avant tout, elle symbolise une profonde crise de la diplomatie, avec un risque réel de contagion. Sous leurs avatars les plus extrêmes, comme les leaders autoritaires du Venezuela et de la Russie, l’organisation d’élections libres n’est même plus nécessaire puisque ces présidents savent déjà ce que veut vraiment « le peuple ».

Mais les hommes forts peuvent être aussi se montrer très combatifs électoralement quand les électeurs ont le sentiment que les acteurs politiques traditionnels ne répondent pas à leurs attentes, comme nous l’avons vu dans le cas des Philippines.

La victoire de l’élan électoral populiste, illustré par le Brexit et l’élection de Trump, n’a pas eu lieu dans de petits pays à la visibilité limitée, mais, au contraire, s’est ancrée dans les deux plus anciennes et plus expérimentées des démocraties contemporaines. Or, ces dernières, malgré leur nombreux écueils, ont joué un rôle crucial dans l’exercice démocratique à travers le monde.

Ainsi, l’une des conséquences de la conquête populiste de la Maison-Blanche marquera le déclin de l’influence américaine.

D’ailleurs, l’élection de Trump a déjà eu un impact négatif sur le soft-power américain. Les États-Unis sont désormais moins capables d’attirer et de coopter (plutôt que de s’imposer par la force), affaiblissant la légitimité du pouvoir démocratique ailleurs dans le monde.

Cette tendance se révélera particulièrement vraie si Trump s’entête dans certaines de ses promesses de campagne, notamment dans son projet de discrimination à l’encontre des personnes de confession musulmane.

À mesure que se renforceront et se développeront les mouvements et courants islamophobes dans les démocraties occidentales, les États-Unis, parmi d’autres, perdront toute légitimité dans leurs critiques des gouvernements chinois, birmans et d’autres, sur leur façon de traiter les minorités religieuses.

Sous le gouvernement Trump, il est fort probable que les États-Unis dépensent moins d’argent en soutien de différents groupes de défense des droits de l’homme et pour la démocratie.

S’il est sain et légitime de critiquer la politique étrangère américaine sur de nombreux dossiers, il faut également reconnaître l’investissement massif de Washington – près de 10 milliards de dollars par an depuis dix ans, auprès d’ONG, de journalistes et de groupes d’opposition au sein de régimes dictatoriaux à travers le monde.

Trump lui, a affirmé très clairement qu’il ne voit aucun intérêt à défendre ou promouvoir la démocratie à l’étranger, et il a d’ailleurs vanté les mérites d’hommes forts tels que Vladimir Poutin, Viktor Orbán et Rodrigo Duterte. Ces deux prises de position réduiront considérablement les possibilités de pression sur les gouvernements autoritaires dans le monde.

Vérité, pluralité et stabilité en voie de disparition

Le retour à l’échelle mondiale des hommes forts a coïncidé avec l’ère de la post-vérité.

Cette tendance menace l’avantage crucial des démocraties par rapport aux régimes autoritaires : l’usage de données disponibles, transparentes afin de formuler les politiques publiques et de bénéficier de débats justes afin d’élire des représentants et dirigeants bien informés et compétents. Elles sont certes bruyantes, mais au final relativement modérées et productrices d’une certaine stabilité.

La prolifération de fausses informations présente également un nouveau défi pour les démocraties.

Les organes de presse, luttant pour s’adapter à l’ère digitale, n’ont pas les moyens de financer le journalisme d’investigation, notamment au niveau local. Pendant ce temps, les réseaux et médias sociaux contribuent à la fragmentation sociale. Aujourd’hui, seules quelques sources d’information concentrées diffusent auprès d’une large proportion de la société.

En résulte un environnement marqué par la méfiance, véritable cadeau du ciel pour les hommes forts de l’ère post-vérité tels que Trump ou Poutine.

Les démocraties tendent également à embrasser la diversité et la mondialisation, se faisant les chantres de l’intégration de migrants du monde entier. Dans la plupart des démocraties occidentales, le pourcentage de la population née à l’étranger est resté constant, aux environs de 10 % depuis plusieurs années, au Canada et en Australie, cette proportion atteint même les 20 %.

Le modèle de gouvernance de l’homme fort repose sur la division et la peur : Trump comme Poutine soulignent constamment les dangers que représentent l’Autre et l’étranger, qu’il s’agisse des « bad hombres » du Mexique pour Trump ou des ONG russes financées par l’étranger pour Poutine. La plupart des observateurs s’attendent désormais à ce que les États-Unis se retirent des accords d’échanges bilatéraux engagés et même des alliances en terme de coopération militaire et de défense, réduisant d’autant plus le rôle des États-Unis sur la scène internationale.

Les démocraties sont désormais perçues comme des régimes plus créatrices d’instabilité économique que les régimes autoritaires, un fait impensable il y a quelques années. De plus, si l’on considère que les sondages ont failli à prédire le Brexit et Trump, les marchés seront désormais encore plus volatiles à chaque élection.

En soit, il s’agit d’une mauvaise nouvelle : les investisseurs ont avant tout besoin de stabilité et de prévisions crédibles. En même temps que l’ère de l’homme fort, l’année 2017 risque bien d’être celle d’une grande instabilité économique aux conséquences désastreuses.

Ce scénario, s’il se fige dans la durée au sein des démocraties, risque de mettre en danger l’essence même de la gouvernance démocratique, d’un point de vue moral, stratégique et économique.

Trump et Poutine : un couple heureux ?

Trump ne connaît pas Poutine, avait célèbrement déclaré dans un débat en octobre 2016 le président américain en devenir.

Même s’ils devenaient amis, cela ne garantirait en rien une relation stable entre les deux pays. L’idée qu’une amitié personnelle entre deux hommes forts produirait une alliance forte est complètement fausse. Cette dernière dépend d’abord de leur capacité à s’entendre sur des accords institutionnels, lesquels sont en général bien plus pérennes.

Erdoğan était si proche du syrien Bashar Al Assad que leurs familles partaient en vacances ensemble. Ce qui ne les a pas empêchés de se déchirer et de produire l’une des inimitiés les plus importantes du Moyen-Orient.

Il semble qu’actuellement la Russie pourrait grandement bénéficier d’un changement d’air politique aux États-Unis. Trump a d’ailleurs parlé en termes très élogieux de son homologue russe, en mentionnant à peine l’immiscion du Kremlin dans les élections américaines.

Mais l’un pourrait très rapidement lâcher l’autre.

Bien que les hommes politiques savent généralement séparer leurs sentiments personnels de leurs actes politiques, Trump et Poutin, vains et endurcis l’un comme l’autre, seront certainement peu enclins au compromis ou à faire machine arrière si leur égo était menaçé.

De telles incertitudes, sans précédent, présagent de mauvais augures pour la croissance. Cependant, pour les populistes du monde entier, la présence d’hommes forts à Washington et à Moscou est un signal sans équivoque.

L’élection présidentielle en France, où Marine Le Pen est une candidate pressentie déterminera si 2017 est vraiment l’année des hommes (ou de la femme) forts. Sa victoire sonnerait le glas de l’Union européenne. Tandis que les électeurs français et allemands se préparent à voter, les enjeux n’ont jamais été aussi élevés.

fonte: The Conversation

Zygmunt Bauman

Zygmunt Bauman (19.11.1925 / 9.01.2017)
9 jan 2017

The Associated Press

WARSAW, Poland — Zygmunt Bauman, one of the most prominent and prolific European sociologists of recent decades, has died at the age of 91. The Polish-born left-wing thinker's works explored the fluidity of identity in the modern world, the Holocaust, consumerism and globalization.

Bauman died at his home in Leeds, England, on Monday surrounded by his family, according to Anna Zejdler-Janiszewska, a Warsaw-based philosophy professor and friend of Bauman's who was informed of his death by his wife.

Renowned for an approach that incorporated philosophy and other disciplines, Bauman was a strong moral voice for the poor and dispossessed in a world upended by globalization. Whether he was writing about the Holocaust or globalization, his focus remained on how humans can create a dignified life through ethical decisions.

He wrote more than 50 books, notably "Modernity and the Holocaust," a 1989 release in which he differed with many other thinkers who saw the barbarism of the Holocaust as a breakdown in modernity. 

Bauman viewed the mass exterminations of Jews as the very outcome of such pillars of modernity as industrialization and rationalized bureaucracy.

"It was the rational world of modern civilization that made the Holocaust thinkable," Bauman wrote.

In the 1990s, Bauman coined the term "liquid modernity" to describe a contemporary world in such flux that individuals are left rootless and bereft of any predictable frames of reference. In books including "Liquid Times" and "Liquid Modernity" he explored the frailty of human connection in such times and the insecurity that a constantly changing world creates.

"In a liquid modern life there are no permanent bonds, and any that we take up for a time must be tied loosely so that they can be untied again, as quickly and as effortlessly as possible, when circumstances change," Bauman wrote.

In informing friends in Poland of his death Monday, Bauman's wife wrote that he had gone "to liquid eternity."

In Poland, he was a controversial figure in some circles. In 2006, a right-wing historian uncovered documents showing that Bauman served as an officer in a Stalinist-era military organization, the Internal Security Corps, which was helping to impose communism on the nation by killing resisters to the regime. Bauman acknowledged belonging to that unit, but he insisted that he only had a desk job. No evidence has surfaced linking him to any killings.

Some nationalists saw him as an enemy of the country.

In 2013, supporters of a far-right organization disturbed a public debate with Bauman in the western Polish city of Wroclaw, whistling and shouting "Shame!" and "down with communism!" and holding up photos of Polish resistance fighters killed by the communists.

After that he stopped visiting his homeland.

Beyond Poland, Bauman's theories were a major influence on the anti-globalization movement. 

He focused on the outcasts and the marginalized, describing how many people have seen their chances of a dignified life destroyed by the new borderless world. 

As a result, he found a following in Spain and Italy, where young adults were hit especially hard by economic dislocation in recent years.

"The key thing was that Bauman did not talk at or down to his audience — when he was talking he was listening, when he was teaching he was learning. 

His books and seminars were places where we could come together and explore together how to be human," Keith Tester, co-author of "Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman" and a former student of Bauman's, told The Associated Press on Monday.

Bauman was born Nov. 19, 1925, in Poznan, Poland, into a Polish-Jewish family that had suffered poverty and anti-Semitism, something that inspired his lifelong belief in tolerance and social justice. Speaking decades later of how he became a communist, he recalled his family's poverty, the "blows and kicks" inflicted on him by non-Jewish children on the playground and "the humiliations which my father, a man of impeccable honesty, had to suffer from his bosses to feed his family."

He was not yet 14 when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 and World War II began. His family survived the Holocaust by fleeing to the Soviet Union. There, Bauman, still a teenager, joined a Polish army unit that was formed under Soviet command, earning Poland's Military Cross of Valor for his bravery.

After the war, he rose quickly in the military ranks and by the early 1950s he had become one of the youngest majors in the Polish army. During these years he was a communist and a member of the Polish Workers' Party.

In 1953, he was abruptly fired from his army job, apparently the victim of the communist regime's anti-Israel stance — Bauman's father had been seen making inquiries at the Israeli Embassy about emigrating.

Bauman studied sociology, then philosophy, at the University of Warsaw, and was teaching there when the communist regime waged an anti-Semitic campaign in 1968. He lost his job and he and his family were expelled from the country along with thousands of other Polish Jews.

Though he was a vocal critic of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, once likening the West Bank to the Warsaw Ghetto, Bauman lived and taught for a short time in Israel. 

He lectured at universities in Tel Aviv and Haifa from 1969 to 1971, before he and his family settled in Britain. Bauman headed the Department of Sociology at the University of Leeds until his retirement in 1990 but continued to write prolifically even after his retirement, often producing a book a year.

Among his numerous honors were the European Amalfi Prize for Sociology in 1992, the Theodor W. Adorno Award in 1998 and the Prince of Asturias Award in 2010. The University of Leeds also created the Bauman Institute in his honor, dedicated to many of his concerns, including ethics, consumerism, globalization and modernity.

Bauman's wife of 62 years, Janina Bauman, died in 2009. He is survived by his second wife, Aleksandra Jasinska-Kania, the daughter of postwar Polish president Boleslaw Bierut, three daughters and several grandchildren.

fonte: New York Times

International Politics in 2017: Ten Predictions

Postwestern World
Oliver Suenkel 
dec 2016

1. A post-truth world: Democracy in crisis 

The toxic combination of rising inequality, growing polarization, the proliferation of "fake news" and populist candidates will pose a severe challenge to democracies around the world, particularly those in Europe and North America. 

News organizations will continue to struggle to adapt, already facing a shortage of funds for investigative journalism (particularly on the local level). Social media contributes to a move towards highly compartmentalized, fragmented societies (or "silo societies"), and the number of platforms to promote national debates that reach all domestic groups is shrinking. This growing disconnect will make it ever harder to predict election outcomes. 

The implications of this new reality will be closely watched during election campaigns in Germany, France, Norway and the Netherlands, but also in Chile and Ecuador in 2017. 

While Merkel can be expected to get reelected for a historic fourth term, possibly making her the longest-serving leader in German democratic history, François Fillon will struggle to beat Marine Le Pen in the second round. Democracies will — for now — not only lose some of their soft power, but be seen as the sources of elevated political risk, and markets will be more volatile ahead of elections. Also, populists will, in general, spend less money to support human rights and pro-democracy groups around the world, reducing pressure on authoritarian governments.

2. A divided West in a Post-Western World

At a time of multiplying global challenges and a shift of power to the Asia-Pacific region, Brexit, no matter how it plays out, will be harmful to Western strategic interests as it reduces Europe's political weight and its capacity to shape global affairs in a Post-Western World. In addition, the Trump victory in the United States will weaken the stability of trans-Atlantic partnership. Brexit has transformed a win-win relationship between Britain and continental Europe into a zero-sum game. 

Seeking to set an example and to weaken exit movements in France and elsewhere, the EU is likely to assure Brexit will be as painful as possible for the UK. To save itself, the EU can be expected to push for a harsh settlement to hammer home the price of leaving. 

Considering that the coming decades will be shaped, above all, by a Washington-Beijing-led bipolar order, with US interests ever more in Asia than in the Atlantic, anything but more integration will further diminish, from a geopolitical perspective, Europe's role in global affairs. All the while, China continues to craft the building blocks of what we may call a “parallel order” that will initially complement and at some point possibly replace today’s international institutions. 

This order is already in the making; it includes, among others, institutions such as the BRICS-led New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (to complement the World Bank), Universal Credit Rating Group (to complement Moody’s and S&P), China Union Pay (to complement Mastercard and Visa), CIPS (to complement SWIFT), the BRICS (to complement the G7), and many other initiatives. 

As the West falters, new partnerships will emerge, adapting to the shift of power. For example, as the US and Europe are seen as less influential by Delhi and Tokyo, their ties have prospered. China has the chance to burnish its credentials as a global goods provider and promoter-in-chief of free trade while Europe and the US are engulfed by protectionism . For example, it already provides more UN peacekeepers than all the other P5 combined. 

We can expect Chinese global leadership in many different areas, such as climate change.

3. A rocky US-China relationship

Even though Donald Trump could still embrace a more conciliatory tone once he moves into the White House, it is unlikely that the world's most important bilateral relationship will be a smooth one, ranging from disagreements on trade and Taiwan to climate change. Trump's ambassador in Beijing is relatively close to Xi Jinping, yet given that the US President will need to keep the China threat alive for domestic reasons, there is a significant risk of unprecedented tension between Washington and Beijing. 

Even a hint of a trade war or, worse, military confrontation between the two would have an immediate global impact. Donald Trump's decision to challenge the "One-China" policy and Beijing's decision to signal its willingness to retaliate by punishing a US automaker accused of price-fixing and by seizing a US underwater drone in the South China Sea suggest that 2017 will see more, not less trouble between Washington and Beijing.

4. A global debate: How to deal with China's growing economic influence?

Policy makers from Hanoi and Berlin to Addis Abeba and Lima are already debating how to deal with China's growing economic influence in their markets. The attempted Chinese takeover of Aixtron, a German maker of semiconductors, caused unprecedented political resistance and the purchase of the US-American portion of Aixtron’s business was ultimately blocked by the US government because, Obama argued, it posed a national security risk relating to “the military applications of the overall technical body of knowledge and experience of Aixtron.” 

Similar debates are taking place in Latin America, where China's influence is growing, and particularly Venezuela, where Beijing is now far more powerful than Washington. In all regions of the world, governments will have to learn to coordinate their positions regarding China better to avoid competing for Chinese largesse, which inevitably leads to a race to the bottom. 

That involves discussing and possibly aligning legislation regarding Chinese investments, transnational environmental rules for Chinese-financed projects that cross borders, and cohesive policies regarding bigger questions such as China’s role in the World Trade Organization.

5. The end of cheap money; bad news for emerging markets

Even though Donald Trump is famously mercurial and contradictory, there is growing evidence that large-scale tax cuts and an increase in public spending will lead to greater inflation and, as a consequence, higher US interest rates. 

That, in turn, will lead to capital outflows from emerging markets to the United States. 

The effects will be felt across the Global South. Beijing will have a harder time stemming the yuan's fall against the dollar without negatively affecting growth or increasing Chinese companies' debt. In Brazil, it will complicate efforts by the fragile Temer administration to reanimate Brazil's economy. 

All of Latin America will face a tough year ahead. To provide an extreme example: we cannot explain the "lost decade" of the 1980s and the political crises across Latin America without taking the US interest rate hike at the beginning of the decade into account. 

What does this mean for Latin America in 2017? Low growth, low approval ratings of incumbents and lots of anti-corruption protests.  

6. Middle East remains in chaos, Western influence dwindles

The recent fall of Aleppo signals, above all, Western powers' failure to influence events in what has become the bloodiest conflict in the 21st century. Russia and Iran, by contrast, have achieved what a few years ago looked highly unlikely: maintain their ally Assad in power. 

Yet Syria can be expected to remain a battlefield in 2017, and the indiscriminate killing of civilians by the Russian airforce and the Assad regime will maintain the capacity of the Islamic State to gain supporters. In addition, the conflicts in Iraq, Libya and Yemen are set to continue, prolonging the worst refugee crisis since World War II. Western influence will also decline in Turkey as an increasingly authoritarian President Erdogan carries out his purge. 

2017 may see the intensification of violence between Turkey and various Kurdish armed groups within Turkey and all over the region. Trump's choice of David Friedman as US Ambassador to Israel virtually eliminates any probability of a constructive US role in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

7. The global crackdown on human rights accelerates

The year 2016 saw series of sad records — regarding the number of journalists and bloggers detained and attacked, the number of NGOs harassed and the number of opposition politicians and activists killed. 

More governments than ever, many of them democratic ones, passed restrictive laws that stifle and threaten civil society. Almost half the world’s countries have implemented controls that affect tens of thousands of organizations across the globe, and others are likely to follow suit. 

They are by no means concentrated in one region of the world. Rather, speaking truth to power is dangerous in many places, like Cuba (where the governments routinely detains activists), Brazil (where more environmental activists are killed than anywhere else in the world), Egypt, Hungary, Israel, Russia, China, Thailand and several African countries, where gay rights activists are often killed with impunity. With several countries that traditionally gave a lot of money to support rights groups, such as the United States, ruled by populists, the crackdown will accelerate further. 

With Beijing's economic influence felt across the world, speaking out against human rights violations in China is becoming prohibitively costly for most countries.

8. Cyber attacks go global

It is not just since Russia's attempts influence the 2016 US presidential election that cyber attacks are increasingly becoming the weapon of choice to destabilize enemies. China has attempted to steal data and cause disruption in the United States for years, and the United States and Israel have used cyber attacks against Iran in the past. 

Since there are virtually no globally agreed upon rules of the game (e.g., what constitutes an act of war and what does not), states have an incentive to opt for cyber attacks rather than conventional warfare whenever they can. 

At the same time, the lack of rules also means that there is a significant risk of escalation, a reason why President Obama has not yet decided how to respond to Russian interference in the US election. 2017 may see disruptive cyberattack on critical infrastructure of large economies, even though targeted attacks against politicians to influence electoral outcomes (as seen in the US) is more likely. 

Many countries around the world — such as Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa — will have to invest considerable sums to catch up in the cyber realm to adequately protect themselves.

9. Afghanistan: Eternal nightmare

Few countries have suffered as much as Afghanistan over the past centuries, yet little indicates that the worst will be over anytime soon. Quite to the contrary: fifteen years after the US-led invasion, 2017 is likely to see increased violence and instability in Afghanistan resulting from a continued strengthening of the Taliban insurgency and possible government collapse.

Aside from the Afghans themselves, several other countries will be affected: Chinese plans to integrate the country into its much-vaunted One Belt-One Road (OBOR) initiative will be made more difficult, Pakistan can continue to influence affairs in Kabul, and countries like Germany will see a growing stream of Afghans seeking asylum.

10. Black swans (Low-probability, high-impact events)

Most forecasts in international politics fail to take into account the possibility of wild cards. 

When we think back to the most momentous events during the past decades, many of them – including Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, decolonization in Africa, the Iranian Revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the terrorist attacks on September 11th or Donald Trump's election victory– were fairly unpredictable. 

For 2017, the most plausible unlikely high-impact events are political instability in China (which would send economic shock waves around the world), the fall of the House of Saud and the rise of hardline Islamists in Saudi Arabia (shifting dynamics in the Middle East as dramatically as in 1979), an Italian default that would lead to the end of the euro, and an impeachment trial against Donald Trump.

fonte: Postwestern World

Brazil’s top 10 foreign policy challenges in 2017

Postwestern World
Oliver Suenkel 
dec 2016

Brazil's foreign policy under its three former Presidents — Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)— was, despite some setbacks, shaped, above all, by the challenges of managing Brazil's rise and transformation into a modern, globally visible actor. 

The interim government led by Michel Temer, by contrast, seeks to arrest Brazil's decline as Latin America's largest economy enters what may become the fourth straight year of near zero or negative growth. This requires updating some of the key tenets of Brazilian foreign policy, while maintaining others. 

Above all, considering the extremely limited time Temer remains in office and the fact that 2018 will mostly be dedicated to campaigning (with his Foreign Minister José Serra, pictured above, expected to run for president again), foreign policy makers will have to pick their battles wisely. Below are ten key challenges they will face over the coming twelve months: 

1. Help accelerate Brazil's economic recovery

Brazil's economy is in tatters and no foreign policy in the world could fix it without profound domestic reforms, some of which are already taking place. And yet, a wisely designed foreign policy can make an important contribution. 

That implies reviving Mercosur (suspending Venezuela was a good start) and actively pursuing free-trade agreements, making BNDES' foreign lending more transparent and effective, solving the outstanding double-taxation issues through bilateral agreements, and clearly articulating to international investors how Brazil seeks to get out of the economic mess (a plan to move up 30 spots in the World Bank's Doing Business Ranking would be a good start). 

It also includes aggressively seeking funding from the BRICS-led New Development Bank, restarting the scholarship program for Brazilian students abroad (but limiting it to engineers), facilitating immigration rules and actively attracting skilled migrants (from places like Syria) and slashing cumbersome visa rules to double the number of foreign tourists. 

By the end of 2017, Brazil should no longer be the most inward-looking economy of the G20, a position it occupies today.

2. Develop a regional long-term strategy vis-à-vis Venezuela

The political, economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela presents the greatest challenge to South America in years. With the Venezuelan government now essentially in the hands of the military, Brazilian foreign policy must focus on damage control; i.e. reduce large-scale human suffering in the neighboring country. 

A significant part of the population is no longer having three meals a day. 

Public hospitals across the country lack even basic medicines. Looting of supermarkets is becoming more common. People with chronic diseases that require medication are forced to emigrate if they want to survive. Brasília should therefore lead an international effort to put pressure on the Maduro government to allow the delivery of basic medicines to hospitals across Venezuela. 

Addressing the humanitarian crisis is not only morally compelling, but also in Brazil's national interest: the longer the problem festers, the greater the risk of civil strife in Venezuela, which could create instability on a regional scale. At the same time, Brazil should continue attempts to isolate Venezuela diplomatically in an effort to force Maduro to accept free elections. Rather than “solving” the region's Venezuela problem, policy makers will for now have to content themselves with administering it. 

It will be left to Temer's (and Serra's) successors to find a lasting solution.

3. Manage the global corruption fallout

Termed the “biggest international bribery case in history” by the US Department of Justice, corruption related to Odebrecht's global operations have cast a shadow over Brazil's international reputation, and Brazilian foreign policy makers will have to deal with the enormous backlash of the international dimension of the Lava Jato investigation in the coming months. 

Politicians in several countries consider being associated to the company as toxic, and Panama and Colombia have recently conditioned the company's continued presence on better cooperation by Odebrecht with criminal investigations. Peru said it would no longer work with the Brazilian company after it had "corrupted three Peruvian governments." 

One of the best ways to reduce the fallout is to actively show the world how Brazil has embraced tougher anti-corruption legislation and how it is able and willing to take a lead in international efforts to curb corrupt practices. 

That involves promoting the debate on this topic on the big stages in 2017: the World Economic Forum in Davos, the International Security Conference in Munich (Embraer is also embroiled in bribery cases), the G20 in Hamburg, the 9th BRICS Summit in Xiamen, Mercosur and UNASUR meetings and the UN General Assembly in New York. 

Temer could also convene a specific meeting of regional heads of state to discuss devising a common strategy on the matter, such as more data-sharing and training for public prosecutors (which are weak and not independent in several South American countries). 

This not only produces benefits for Brazil, but for the international community as well, considering that the United States' role in the global fight against corruption may change under President Trump.

4. Explain Brazil's unique moment to the world 

Brazil is going through a unique moment in its history. While many business sectors and state bureaucracy had a a close and often incestuous relationship for the past 500 years, these practices are no longer workable as the Lava Jato investigation is altering the way politics and business works, possibly forever changing public tolerance of corruption. 

Understandably, this has temporarily paralyzed several key actors, who have to learn how to engage properly, with negative short-term economic consequences. Foreign policy makers must show international observers that this is, above all, a positive development, as it will make Brazil, in the end, a more modern, transparent and democratic society. 

Only if this is communicated successfully will investors from around the world help Brazil recover from its worst recession in history. 

5. Prepare for a more Asia-centric world

China may grow somewhat slower than before, but few would seriously dispute that we are witnessing a momentous shift of power to Asia. The world economy will not return to the distribution of power of the late 20th century, and Asia's weight will make itself felt in every aspect of global affairs. 

Brazil's embassy in Beijing has grown over the past years, but the number of diplomats in other key locations like Tokyo, Delhi, Manila and Hanoi is still too low. After all, it is in these countries that the most important dynamic of the 21st century (a growing clash of interests between Washington and Beijing) will play out. 

Embracing a more Asia-centric world cannot be done by the Foreign Ministry alone — Brazilian universities, newspapers and companies are an essential element in this reorientation. 

Being a founding member of the China-led AIIB and actively involved in the BRICS grouping are important steps in the right direction.

6. Design a strategy to address domestic violence

In 2015, a staggering 58,383 people were assassinated in Brazil. The number of murders in Brazil increased over 250 percent in the last three decades, jumping from 13,910 in 1980 to above 50,000 in 2012. This means that one person is killed in the country every nine minutes, or 160 per day. 

Since there is little hope for systematic progress on the domestic level, diplomats can work towards creating international rules and norms with teeth and building momentum that will, in turn, increase the pressure on domestic actors to adapt to regional or global standards. 

A first step would be promoting gun registration on a regional scale and strengthening cross-border cooperation. Despite an existing set of regional agreements, the majority of the millions of firearms in Brazil are not registered, and though most are produced in Brazil, they are often sold abroad and are then smuggled back into the country.

7. Recover Brazil's voice in global security matters — by starting at home

When it comes to the dominant themes in global security over the past twelve months, such as the civil wars in Syria, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Ukraine, the global refugee crisis or terrorism, Brazil has rarely gone beyond the role of a bystander, ceding airtime to traditional powers. 

Yet Brasília could be far more pro-active in the global discussion about how to effectively address the challenges listed above, and positively influence dynamics —as it has done, in the past years, regarding humanitarian intervention, internet governance, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and defending democracy. 

That requires, first of all, being in the room when such things are discussed -- such as at the yearly Munich Security Conference, where Brazil too often has been absent in the past years. That also involves prioritizing security issues at home. 

Brazil largely fails at managing its borders and the security threats that emanate from it, related to the smuggling of people, drugs and arms. Brazil is now a key base for drug traffickers, and the country must establish a better strategy to cooperate with neighbors in addressing organized crime in the region. 

8. Tackle growing challenges in cyberspace

New communication technologies erode hierarchies, collapse time and distance, and empower networks. That will have a massive impact on international relations, and cybersecurity will be a key element of foreign policy making in the coming decades. Issues that define cybersecurity today -- such as incident response, the problem of attribution, overlapping investigative and legal authorities, public-private partnerships, and the necessity of international cooperation — are much-discussed in Washington, Berlin, Moscow and Beijing, but Brazil still lacks the expertise to play a key role in the global debate about the rules and norms of cybersecurity. 

The same applies to international relations scholars at Brazilian universities and think tanks, which remain largely unprepared to weigh in on the issue. To provide an example: The German defence ministry has stepped up its electronic warfare capabilities with the creation of a new 13,500-strong cyber unit, to be operational in 2017. 

The issue already produces real challenges the Brazilian government has failed to tackle effectively. Brazil is one of the world's leaders when it comes to hacking and online fraud. Yet rather than militarizing the issue, the government should lead a global debate on how to create international frameworks to help achieve a safe cyber realm — e.g. by helping train a growing number of specialists in government, the private sector and civil society is essential to achieve this aim.

9. Strengthen BRICS, revive IBSA

Contradicting all expectations of the imminent dissolution of the group, the BRICS member countries have worked towards strengthening cooperation for one decade. 

The BRICS not only continued to exist but also started a process of institutionalization, leading to regular ministerial meetings in areas such as education, public health and national security, frequent encounters between presidents and foreign ministers and – perhaps most importantly – the creation of the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai, and the contingent reserve agreement, a financial safety net for times of financial crisis. 

The BRICS summit is now a major pillar of the yearly travel schedule of the nations’ presidents, irrespective of ideology. Brazil should promote a broader debate about how it can benefit from the grouping ahead of the 9th BRICS Summit in China. 

Parallel to the BRICS grouping, the government should consider reviving the IBSA grouping. Despite the current political crisis in Pretoria, South Africa will remain an important partner, and India will shape the global economy of the 21st century like few other powers.

10. Continue to work towards reforming international institutions

Why should Brazil care about reforming the UN Security Council in times like these? The answer is simple: Because global responsibilities are not a function of fluctuating growth rates at home. 

There is little use for a country that engages constructively on international issues in good times, only to disappear when the economy is not doing so well. That is why Brazil's diplomatic retreat under Dilma Rousseff has been so damaging: The moment a future president will adopt a more visible international role, it will make international observers wonder whether this is just another fluke. The logic of why international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNSC need reform remains as valid as ever, and Brazil's crisis does not alter the overall trend of multipolarization.

fonte: Postwestern World

Ten things to look forward to in international politics in 2017

Postwestern World
Oliver Stuenkel
dec 2016

1. The best UN Secretary General in decades

Considering Donald Trump's foreign policy ideas, Jacob Zuma's and Nicolás Maduro's grasp of economics or London's difficulties to spell out a coherent Brexit strategy, some commentators argue we have entered the 'Age of Incompetence'. 

Indeed, it seems like discussing policy options in a substantive way is a recipe for electoral disaster in many countries. António Guterres, the new UN Secretary General, provides a welcome contrast — combining expert knowledge (he served as High Commissioner for Refugees for ten years) with the political skill and charisma his predecessors sorely lacked. 

The challenges he faces, including the worst refugee crisis in history and bloody civil wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya and South Sudan are enormous and he can impossibly solve them alone. However, Guterres could go a long way in creating a new narrative about an institution many around the world no longer believe in.

2. Germany resists the populist trend

Angela Merkel can be expected to bag a record fourth election victory (after 2005, 2009 and 2013), even though her party is likely to lose seats. For the first time in post-war Germany, a right-wing party will be represented in parliament, but Germany is not as vulnerable to populist and nationalist tendencies as Poland, Hungary or even France, where Marine Le Pen has a real chance of winning the presidency. 

Even a potential continuation of terrorist attacks throughout 2017 is unlikely to change this reality, and Europe's biggest economy will play the much-needed role of stabilizer across the continent. This is good news for the continued existence of the European Union, and Merkel is set to play a crucial leadership role in the West — and a much-needed voice that will reliably speak out against President Trump's excesses on the international stage.

3. China increasingly assumes global responsibility; especially vis-à-vis climate change

With the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House, many Western observers believe today's global order will not survive the withdrawal of US-American leadership. Indeed, President Trump could become a source of global instability if his staff allows him to take foreign policy decisions. Yet we must be careful not to be trapped by a parochial Western-centric narrative that blindly assumes that only Western powers can take the lead and provide global public goods.

Our Western-centric worldview thus leads us to underappreciate not only the role non-Western actors have played in the past and play in contemporary international politics, but also the role they are likely to play in the future. Since Trump's election victory China has taken a relatively constructive approach, and it can be expected to provide ever more global public goods, especially in the realm of climate change, where Beijing will mark a welcome contrast to Trump's views. 

4. Immigrants around the world will continue to help their host societies prosper

Immigrants make societies not only more diverse, but also more dynamic, entrepreneurial and prosperous. The United States serves as a powerful example, where a brief look at the statistics shows the massive impact immigrants have on the US economy's capacity to innovate and generate jobs: some 40% of Fortune 500 firms were founded by immigrants or their children. So were the firms behind seven of the ten most valuable brands in the world.

Although the foreign-born are only an eighth of the US population, a quarter of high-tech start-ups have an immigrant founder. Apple, Google, AT&T, Budweiser, Colgate, eBay, General Electric, IBM and McDonalds, owe their origin to a founder who was an immigrant or the child of an immigrant. Steve Jobs, the co-founder of Apple, is a child of an immigrant parent from Syria. Walt Disney also was the child of an immigrant (from Canada), as well as the founders of Oracle (Russia and Iran), IBM (Germany), Clorox (Ireland), Boeing (Germany), 3M (Canada) and Home Depot (Russia). 

In 2017, migrants, both those with and without proper documentation, will continue to enrich their host societies both culturally and economically. 

5. The Iran nuclear deal will survive

Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to undo Barack Obama's signature foreign policy achievement: the historic Iran nuclear deal signed with Tehran and six world powers. That would be a tremendous setback to political stability in the Middle East. 

Yet while Trump may seek to undermine the deal, China, Russia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom will work against him. What is often overlooked is that even if Trump withdraws from the treaty, it will continue to stand, as specified in the UN Security Council resolution.

6. Elections in Ecuador; Correa does not cling to power (unlike Bolivia's Morales)

Democracy is non-existent or under threat in several countries in Latin America, including Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia, where Evo Morales recently announced that he would ignore the results of a referendum and run for a fourth consecutive presidential term, violating his country's constitution. 

Rafael Correa, by contrast, who came to power in 2007, agreed to step down next year to allow for a change of power. This is particularly good news because Correa is known to possess an authoritarian streak, having repeatedly attempted to undermine civil society and independent media during his time in office. Just like Lula's decision not to seek another term in 2010, Correa's attitude to leave power to allow for someone else to take over is to be welcomed.

7. Ghana's new government can be expected to do a good job

Ghana's surprising opposition triumph in December 2016 was, above all, a victory for democracy. Nana Akufo-Addo, the new President, will preside a country that has held seven consecutive free elections since Ghana became a democracy in 1992, underlining how important the small country (of less than 30m people) is as a symbol for democracy both in the region and in the Global South in general. 

In nearby Gambia, by contrast, Yahya Jammeh resisted conceding defeat after losing a presidential election to his opponent. Akufo-Addo, a former Attorney-General and Foreign Minister, is largely thought to be qualified and can be expected to continue Ghana's democratic and economic success story.

8. Trump will be unable to implement many of his campaign promises

Hopes for a "Trump presidency light" are often criticized as wishful thinking. The truth is that Donald Trump poses a real threat to the strength of US institutions and to its democracy as a whole. In addition to weakening the social fabric of US society and viciously attacking any non-white minorities, boasting about sexual assault against women and mocking disabled people, Trump's systematic verbal attacks on the judiciary, threats to prosecute journalists and allusions to voter fraud significantly undermined democratic culture in the United States. 

However, there is a silver lining: Trump will be unable to implement many of his bizarre ideas, such as the forced deportation of more than 10 million undocumented workers, the construction of a border wall in the South (Trump will most probably do little more than add a few kilometers of fence), or start a trade war with China. Finally, there is a reasonable chance that Trump will be impeached if Congress turns against him.

9. China will finally join the fight against the commerce in ivory

After the United States ended its domestic ivory trade in 2016, Beijing finally announced that it would ban all commerce in ivory by the end of 2017. This will be crucial to reduce demand for the material in the Middle Kingdom and go a long way to protect elephant populations. 

Over 100,000 elephants have been killed across Africa due to Chinese demand over the past decade. Illegal poaching and trade, of course, will continue, but the new law is a major victory for civil society groups that have put pressure on China for years.

10. A milestone in the battle against Ebola

After the disastrous Ebola outbreak in West Africa between 2013 and 2016 that killed more than 10,000 in West Africa and a few isolated cases in Europe and the United States, the creation of the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine is a significant step towards reducing the risks of global pandemics, and a boost for a region that suffered enormously in the aftermath of the crisis. 

It is also an important, if belated, step towards reducing the risk of a global pandemic that could wreak havoc with the global, ultra-connected economy. The application of the vaccine, expected to start in the coming months, shows what can be done if the global scientific community unites around a common aim. 

fonte: Postwestern World